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Environmental Crisis and the Paradox of Organizing 
Gregg P. Macey 
ABSTRACT 
Public organizations, including those involved in contingency 
planning, have tremendous influence over the ultimate scale and scope 
of an environmental crisis. Yet our understanding of how 
organizational behavior can either rein in or exacerbate crises 
continues to lag behind advances in technology. This Article considers 
the role of public organizations in the blowout of the Macondo well in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Its theoretical lens is the “paradox of organizing,” a 
frame that I suggest should be applied to interorganizational responses 
to low-probability, high-consequence events. The struggle to differentiate 
tasks and subunits and then piece them together during moments of 
great uncertainty can challenge and strain contingency planning, such 
as what is envisioned by the National Contingency Plan. Through the 
paradox of organizing, the organizational roots of a crisis, such as the 
accidental release of oil or hazardous substances, are recreated and 
amplified during an interorganizational response to that crisis. I 
discuss several dynamics that were reproduced by the response system 
awakened by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  They included risk 
amplification and system degradation due to the structure of the 
response, through processes including “anarchy,” “drift,” and “fire 
fighting.” They also involved the tasks of making sense of information 
within the response effort, which erases detail, limits whether data can 
be used to detect anomalies, and encourages responders to develop their 
own plausible rationales for equivocal data so that they can resume 
interrupted tasks.  These dynamics go beyond the narratives that 
dominate standard regulatory accounts of accidents. They point to how 
multiagency response can intensify the paradox of organizing. 
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Environmental law was borne out of crisis.1 Our most storied 
regulatory achievements happened because shocking and often 
sudden events—among them the burning Cuyahoga River,2 noxious 
                                                
 1. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58–60 (2004). I 
focus here on industrial crises, in keeping with Shrivastava’s study of situations where 
“organized industrial activities are the source of major damage to human life, and natural and 
social environments” that “extend beyond the organization of origin to encompass a broad 
range of economic, social and political agents and forces.” Paul Shrivastava, Ian I. Mitroff, 
Danny Miller & Anil Miglani, Understanding Industrial Crises, 25 J. MGMT. STUD. 285, 287 
(1988). More broadly, crises can be viewed as “low probability/high consequence events.” 
Karl E. Weick, Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations, 25 J. MGMT. STUD. 305, 305 (1988).  
 2. The Cuyahoga River saga and other events led to the enactment of the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: 
Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 94–95 
(2002); Sandra Zellmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections from a Post-Katrina 
World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 625 (2007).  
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chemicals in the basements of Love Canal,3 deadly plumes of methyl 
isocyanate in Bhopal,4 and crude oil strewn across Prince William 
Sound5—catalyzed a nascent movement6 and helped overcome the 
collective action problems that stood in the way of social change.7 In 
so doing, these focal points8 and the laws they inspired gave federal 
and state agencies responsibilities that heretofore had been left to 
private ordering or local governments.9 Forty years into this 
regulatory experiment, the onset of man-made disasters10—linked to 
everything from thermal energy spikes in the lower atmosphere11 to 
the spread of unruly technologies12—proceeds apace.  
Environmental law will continue to revisit these kinds of 
upheavals, but with unprecedented frequency. James Speth argues 
                                                
 3. Love Canal sparked a heightened interest in hazardous waste sites that led to the 
enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). See Robert V. Percival, Regulatory 
Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 173. 
 4. Bhopal contributed to a legislative atmosphere in which the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 300–330, 
100 Stat. 1728 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006)), was passed. See 
Susan G. Hadden, Citizen Participation in Environmental Policy Making, in LEARNING FROM 
DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 92–93 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994); Bradley C. 
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, 
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 259 n.2 (2001).  
 5. Following the Exxon Valdez disaster Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: 
Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon 
Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11041, 
11043 (2010).  
 6. See Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS 
L.J. 395, 414 (1995); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental 
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212 (2001). 
 7. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992). See generally Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, 
Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2147 (2009). 
 8. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1659 (2000). 
 9. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 65–67 
(5th ed. 2007). 
 10. Barry A. Turner, The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of 
Disasters, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 378, 381–82 (1976). 
 11. For how a modest increase in global temperature might influence geopolitics in 
various parts of the world, see GWYNNE DYER, CLIMATE WARS: THE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL AS 
THE WORLD OVERHEATS 1–2, 29–40, 75–84, 111–21, 215–26 (2010). 
 12. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN 
AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 127–30 (1989). 
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that environmental regulation may soon become “a law of coping 
with crisis and urgent remediation.”13 J.B. Ruhl speculates that it 
might be forced to split into distinct branches: one to address 
pollution control and conservation and others devoted entirely to 
mitigation and adaptation.14 Environmental law is thus revisiting its 
roots in crisis. This Article explores lessons that regulators have not 
learned as they have uneasily tended to the crises that ushered in the 
regulations that guide their behavior. Its focus is on environmental 
crisis management, particularly the contingency planning system that 
sets out how the government will contain, disperse, and otherwise 
mitigate releases of oil and hazardous substances. Additionally, this 
Article addresses the “failure of response systems to improve 
alongside advances in exploration technology,”15 such as the systems 
that plagued deepwater drilling before the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill and haunted the response effort that followed. Those systems 
amplify the “paradox of organizing,” which can lead to predictable 
pathologies in the wake of a crisis.  
Legal scholars have begun to point to how environmental 
regulations are of limited use in preparing for crisis. For example, 
regulations are fragmented and unadaptive,16 focus on slow-moving 
rather than sudden events,17 rely on ill-placed standards and 
                                                
 13. James Gustave Speth, On One Hand, Danger, on the Other, Security, ENVTL. F., 
Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 51. 
 14. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 434–35 (2010). 
 15. Memorandum from the Bipartisan Policy Ctr. to the Nat’l Comm’n on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling 13 (Aug. 25, 2010) [hereinafter 
Memorandum], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/36467810/Response-of-the-
Bipartisan-Policy-Center-to-the-Oil-Spill-Commission. 
 16. Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 25–26 (2009). Recently, 
climate-change law, or lack thereof, has been under fire for its failure to prepare for crisis. 
Without significant legislation to prevent or address global climate change, scholars point to 
the failure of existing laws to mitigate its effects in the interim. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, 
“Stationary is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change 
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 35 (2010) (discussing the difficulties of applying 
the preservation and restoration schemes in current laws to the less predictable outcomes of 
climate change); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon 
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 103, 128–32 (2008) (noting the promising nature of carbon capture and sequestration 
and pointing out deficiencies in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and 
CERCLA with regard to governing the regulatory issues that it would present).  
 17. Michael B. Gerrard, Disasters First: Rethinking Environmental Law After September 
11, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 223, 223–24 (2003). Chemical accidents or terrorist attacks on 
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triggers,18 and avoid the land-use planning decisions that would 
buffer vulnerable citizens against the devastation that follows a 
disaster.19 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita unveiled the stunning range 
of contributors to environmental crisis, from pre-hurricane 
vulnerabilities to forces that led to unforeseen problems once the 
                                                                                                           
facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals are another area where existing laws fall short in 
preparing for a crisis. Gerrard argues that we should focus less on incremental environmental 
hazards, such as those addressed by CERCLA, and more on the sudden events that have more 
of an impact on human health. Id. In the chemical regulatory context, scholars have pointed to 
weaknesses in the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the 
EPA’s Risk Management Plans (RMPs), and RCRA in their ability to properly secure facilities. 
See, e.g., Leticia M. Diaz, Chemical Homeland Security, Fact or Fiction: Is the U.S. Ready for an 
Attack on Our Chemical Facilities? An Examination of State and Federal Laws Aimed at 
Immediate Remediation, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1171, 1183–84 (2007). Diaz notes that OSHA, 
CAA, and EPCRA fail to provide vulnerability assessments for chemical facilities, while RCRA’s 
requirements that facilities have warning signs, controlled entry gates, and surveillance apply to 
only twenty-one percent of the total number of chemical facilities. See id.; see also Timothy F. 
Malloy, Of Natmats, Terrorists, and Toxics: Regulatory Adaptation in a Changing World, 26 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 110–13 (2008) (noting that EPA’s RMP for chemical and 
petroleum refineries does not include provisions to create inherently safer designs, but instead 
focuses on risk management). 
 18. Triggers for regulatory action are often keyed to quantity- or risk-based thresholds 
that invite unchecked pollution or accumulation of risk up to those thresholds. Triggers also 
present regulatory gaps that can be exploited by industry, leading to facility expansions and 
grandfathering older, riskier facilities. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, 
Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2007); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The 
Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 
(2011).  
 19. See, e.g., Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government 
Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178–79 (2006) (describing the unintended consequences of 
pre-Katrina urban expansion in New Orleans); William R. Freudenburg, Robert Gramling, 
Shirley Laska, & Kai T. Erikson, Organizing Hazards, Engineering Disasters? Improving the 
Recognition of Political-Economic Factors in the Creation of Disasters, 87 SOC. FORCES 1015, 
1022–28 (2008) (describing floodplain development in the Mississippi Delta region before 
Hurricane Katrina and the effects of 100-year flood protection and the Mississippi River Gulf 
Outlet on development patterns, vulnerability, and the intensity of hurricane damage).  
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floodwaters began to recede.20 As a result, legal scholars concerned 
with crisis are greatly interested in the work of social scientists.21  
This Article makes a more foundational argument. It is an 
argument hinted at by investigations of well-known disasters and 
underscored by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and frantic efforts to 
kill the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico. The notion is 
deceptively simple: what stands between us and the scale and scope 
of future environmental crises are organizations.22 For residents of 
petrochemical corridors, dense urban areas, and flood-hazard 
regions, this notion is unsettling for two reasons. First, by virtue of 
their ubiquity, organizations, both public and private, have “a near-
monopoly of control over access to most of the sources of energy 
which could be discharged to produce disasters.”23 Second, 
regulators have barely begun to appreciate all that can go wrong in a 
world governed by such social structures.  
By undertheorizing how organizations not only cause but also 
shape crises, regulators tell similar stories about accidents,24 
disasters,25 and other events. They respond by passing the same 
                                                
 20. Contributors included man-made channels—dug to ease the flow of commerce and 
direct storm surges inland toward major populations—and reclamation projects that cleared 
away protective wetlands. WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG, ROBERT GRAMLING, SHIRLEY LASKA 
& KAI T. ERIKSON, CATASTROPHE IN THE MAKING: THE ENGINEERING OF KATRINA AND 
THE DISASTERS OF TOMORROW 111–34 (2009). Stormwater surges left behind a toxic sludge 
that accumulated from years of industry and agriculture in the region, along with spills from oil 
platforms and vessels, leading to widespread allergy-like sinus and respiratory problems. Laura 
J. Steinberg, Hatice Sengul & Ana Maria Cruz, Natech Risk and Management: An Assessment 
of the State of the Art, 46 NAT. HAZARDS 143, 146 (2008).  
 21. For an overview of social-science research with a focus on disasters’ social 
production, see Kathleen J. Tierney, From the Margins to the Mainstream? Disaster Research at 
the Crossroads, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 503, 503 (2007). 
 22. For a similar remark about the capacity of public organizations to prevent further 
acts of terrorism in the United States, see Steven Kelman, 9/11 and the Challenges of Public 
Management, 51 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129 (2006) (book review). For the purposes of this Article, I 
define organizations broadly to include “a series of interlocking routines, habituated action 
patterns that bring the same people together around the same activities in the same time and 
places.” This definition includes public and private organizations. Karl E. Weick, The Collapse 
of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 628, 632 
(1993) (quoting Frances R. Westley, Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of 
Inclusion, 11 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 337, 339 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23. BARRY A. TURNER & NICK F. PIDGEON, MAN-MADE DISASTERS 133 (1997). 
 24. An accident is “an unexpected and unintentional event that is the product of 
chance.” Thomas D. Beamish, Accumulating Trouble: Complex Organization, a Culture of 
Silence, and a Secret Spill, 47 SOC. PROB. 473, 473 (2000).  
 25. Disaster research began with studies of collective behavior under high stress, 
including conditions as they might exist in a homogeneous public following nuclear war. The 
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species of laws which address symptoms instead of underlying 
dynamics. The basic narrative of an environmental crisis presents 
several themes: production pressures or financial incentives loomed 
large (the “amoral calculator” argument);26 these pressures and 
incentives were not counterbalanced by sufficient enforcement of 
standards;27 agencies were captured;28 untrained individuals made 
mistakes;29 government lacked the resources, personnel, and 
                                                                                                           
research was functionalist, concerned with how a community returns to normalcy after a 
disruption. As such, disasters were viewed as events “concentrated in time and space” and 
leading to loss of life or property and a disruption in social structure or the provision of social 
services. Charles E. Fritz, Disaster, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 651, 655 (Robert 
K. Merton & Robert A. Nisbet eds., 1961). Disasters are now treated as ongoing, episodic, 
socially constructed, and often foreseeable processes. See generally BEN WISNER, PIERS 
BLAIKIE, TERRY CANNON & IAN DAVIS, AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S 
VULNERABILITY AND DISASTERS (2004). A more accurate definition of disaster begins with a 
“cascade of failures triggered by an extreme event that is exacerbated by inadequate planning 
and ill-informed individual and organizational actions.” Id.  
 26. For a discussion of the “amoral calculator” model as an explanation for managerial 
misconduct, see Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of 
Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23 (1998). For a classic debunking of the argument, see 
DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, 
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 35–39 (1996). See also NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND 
THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 125–26 (2011) [hereinafter DEEPWATER HORIZON 
OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT] (listing time-saving decisions at the Macondo well by BP, 
Transocean, and Halliburton). 
 27. ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N, FINAL REPORT: SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON 
VALDEZ: IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION 16, 20–23, 33 (1990) [hereinafter 
ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT], available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/A/ 
21337991.pdf; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 2, 4, 
68, 72–74; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED 
FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 20–21, 46–48, 55, 63, 66–67 (1979) [hereinafter THREE 
MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT], available at http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads// 
188.pdf; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 102–04 (1990). But see Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-
Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 691, 692, 700–06 (2003). 
 28. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 31, 34, 45; DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 62, 76–78; MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 27–28 (rev. 
ed. 1971); THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 51–52; Peter L. Kahn, 
The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
280, 284–85 (1990); Plater, supra note 5, at 11,042 (“The official state and local regulatory 
agencies often uncritically accepted industry data and assurances on the design and safety of 
system elements, issued permits without required documentation, did not insist on strict 
compliance with corporate and federal rules, and on occasions when they attempted to assert 
regulatory vigilance were resisted, delayed, or overturned by the industry’s greater resources 
and political momentum.”). 
 29. For a discussion of the role of operator error in accounts of disasters, see generally 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2070 
expertise to monitor, inspect, or audit the setting adequately;30 and a 
lack of sufficient redundancy31 or state-of-the-art technology32 
ushered in ill-fated events.  
Lawmakers respond in kind to these narratives with efforts to 
centralize enforcement as well as emergency response and with calls 
for closer coordination among agencies.33 They posit that to 
counteract agency capture, the new or consolidated agency should 
be independent and given greater oversight powers.34 Redundant 
systems should be brought online, as should next-generation 
technologies.35 Data disclosures, real-time monitoring and data 
logging, unannounced inspections, mandatory personnel levels, and 
self-regulatory or third-party certifiers should be introduced or 
ratcheted up to address enforcement gaps.36 Complacency and 
                                                                                                           
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984). 
For Heinrich’s early definition of an industrial accident as the “conjunction of a human error 
and a chance event,” see Rachel Barkan, Dov Zohar & Ido Erev, Accidents and Decision 
Making Under Uncertainty: A Comparison of Four Models, 74 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 118, 118 (1998). See also ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra 
note 27, at 24–26; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 28, 
57, 65, 76–77, 119, 122, 126; THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 10–
11, 20, 22–23, 27, 43–44, 47, 49–50; Everett C. Hughes, Mistakes at Work, 17 CAN. J. 
ECON. & POL. SCI. 320 (1951) (examining mistakes in human work generally). 
 30. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 13–14, 20–21, 23–24, 
32–35, 41–42; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 68, 72–
75, 126–27; THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 21–22, 44–48, 55; 
Dara O’Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community Environmental Policing: Assessing New 
Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 383, 383–85 (2003). 
 31. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 32; DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 97–98; THREE MILE ISLAND 
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 53, 89.  
 32. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 17, 32; DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 56, 135, 251, 269–70, 272–73; 
THREE MILE ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 72–73, 81. 
 33. See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: 
Legislation in the Wake of a Crisis, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 35, 35 (1995); Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the 
Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1655–57 (2006). 
 34. See Holly Doremus, Through Another’s Eyes: Getting the Benefit of Outside 
Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 247, 250–53 (2011); 
Plater, supra note 5, at 11,046. 
 35. See generally Grumbles & Manley, supra note 33, at 36; Mark A. Latham, Five 
Thousand Feet and Below: The Failure to Adequately Regulate Deepwater Oil Production 
Technology, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 343 (2011). 
 36. See Karkkainen, supra note 4 (evaluating in a comprehensive manner EPA’s Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI) program); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: 
Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 447–50 (2011).  
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neglect should be met with proposals to consider worst-case 
scenarios and engender ill-defined “cultures” of safety.37  
These concerns are relevant subjects of inquiry, and an effort has 
been made to point out the bureaucratic causes of, for example, 
capture and inadequate enforcement.38 But the importance of 
organizations as units of analysis has not received adequate attention 
in the regulatory response to environmental crisis. Some accounts, 
including the President’s commission to investigate the causes of the 
British Petroleum (BP) oil spill, point out that crises occur within 
complex social systems.39 Other accounts hint at the managerial 
problems that arise from such complexity or call for improvements to 
the “culture” of an offshore drilling operator or other entity.40 But 
concern for the deviant, “routine by-product[s]” of social systems41 
and their influence over the emergency response architecture that 
grew out of the Exxon Valdez spill, lags well behind advances in 
social science.  
Early attempts to understand how organizations function, 
survive, and influence society have yielded a thriving constellation of 
scholars in sociology, management, public administration, and other 
disciplines42 who are committed to Talcott Parsons’ mandate that we 
                                                
 37. See Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to 
Be a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11033, 11036 (2010) (describing OPA’s required facility 
response plans for worst-case scenarios); Rena Steinzor, Lessons from the North Sea: Should 
“Safety Cases” Come to America?, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 417, 417 (2011). 
 38. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of 
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (explaining how land 
management agencies with multiple goals will systematically overperform on those that are 
complementary or easier to measure); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory 
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 
(1990) (discussing the role of slack in agency capture); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation 
Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 415–17 (1999) 
(describing how organizational structure can influence susceptibility to agency capture).  
 39. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 15–30; DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at viii–x, 223–24; THREE MILE 
ISLAND COMM’N REPORT, supra note 27, at 63–64. 
 40. See, e.g., DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at ix, 
217–25; NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE UNITED STATES 353–57; 416–18 (2004). 
 41. Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster, 
25 ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 274 (1999) (“Organizational deviance, in its generic form, can be 
understood as routine nonconformity: a predictable and recurring product of all socially 
organized systems.”). 
 42. For an overview, see W. Richard Scott, Reflections on a Half-Century of 
Organizational Sociology, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 1 (2004). 
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examine “the role of organizations in the larger sociocultural 
system.”43 These networks include a smaller, innovative group of 
scholars focused on the organizational roots of crisis, breathing 
added life and complexity into Philip Selznick’s work on how 
organizations become “institutionalized” and take on lives of their 
own in ways that divert them from their formal missions.44 The 
events of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the BP oil spill, and other man-
made disasters pose a challenge to this theoretical outpost, as well as 
to environmental law: how do we take what we know about the 
uniquely organizational contributors to crises45 and devise 
regulations that more effectively guide how we respond to those 
crises?  
This Article considers the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in order to 
set out the contours of this necessary conversation. I demonstrate 
that the institutional and administrative arrangements that encourage 
crises are reproduced during the response period.46 This happens 
because the cross-organization plans in use during an emergency 
response provide a more expansive canvas on which the structural 
and cognitive problems of organizing are magnified. Finally, I 
discuss several puzzles in the organization theory literature that 
should be addressed if we are to avoid intensifying the paradox of 
organizing during the next crisis.  
II. DEEPWATER BLOWOUTS AND THE PARADOX OF ORGANIZING 
The paradox of organizing embraces the notion that 
organizations are open systems. Our concept of the organization has 
evolved over decades of inquiry as processing power and theory 
developed, from a research setting where engineers draft 
                                                
 43. W. Richard Scott, The Mandate Is Still Being Honored: In Defense of Weber’s 
Disciples, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 163 (1996). 
 44. See Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270, 271 
(1996). 
 45. For key earlier works on the organizational roots of crisis, see THIERRY C. 
PAUCHANT & IAN I. MITROFF, TRANSFORMING THE CRISIS-PRONE ORGANIZATION (1992); 
PERROW, supra note 29; BARRY A. TURNER, MAN-MADE DISASTERS (1978); Robert P. 
Gephart, Making Sense of Organizationally Based Environmental Disasters, 10 J. MGMT. 205 
(1984); Paul Shrivastava, Industrial Crisis Management: Learning from Organizational 
Failures, 25 J. MGMT. STUD. 283 (1988); Karl E. Weick, The Collapse of Sensemaking 
Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 628 (1993). 
 46. For a discussion of the stages of disaster including the response phase, see David A. 
McEntire, Christopher Fuller, Chad W. Johnston & Richard Weber, A Comparison of Disaster 
Paradigms: The Search for a Holistic Policy Guide, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 267 (2002). 
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management principles and experimentally arrange workers and 
tasks,47 to a more ethnographic space,48 to the unit of analysis itself. 
With this transition came an understanding of the organization as a 
natural49 and, later, open50 system, one with less clearly-defined 
boundaries with its external environment. Far from the series of 
formal structures that occupied industrial psychologists in the first 
half of the twentieth century, the modern theorist accounts for an 
organization’s social structures and their place in a sea of institutions 
                                                
 47. See, e.g., FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC 
MANAGEMENT (1911). 
 48. The Human Relations Movement followed Scientific Management. Relying on field 
studies and other anthropological techniques, it introduced social motives and group dynamics 
to organization theory. See, e.g., F.J. ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM J. DICKSON, 
MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939). For examples of field studies, see KURT LEWIN, 
FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951); W. LLOYD. WARNER & J.O. LOWE, THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM OF THE MODERN FACTORY (1947). These research techniques, particularly situated 
observation, predominated into the 1950s and were used to craft some of the key works in 
industrial sociology. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1955); 
ALVIN W. GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY (1954); CHARLES R. 
WALKER & ROBERT H. GUEST, THE MAN OF THE ASSEMBLY LINE (1952). 
 49. The “natural systems” view of organizations examines the interplay of formal 
structures, created in the pursuit of efficiency, and informal structures, which embody a variety 
of expressions of human sentiment, including communication, reciprocal bonds, and the 
expectations that arise from an individual’s role. See, e.g., CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE 
FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTIVE (1938); GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP (1950); 
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1957). Philip Selznick best 
captured the natural systems view of organizations, demonstrating that they embody 
instrumentalist as well as adaptive qualities. Over time, organizations develop their own 
character, apart from their use as goal-achieving instruments. They become “infused with value 
beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” as they struggle to survive. PHILIP 
SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 17 (1957).  
 50. The “open systems” perspective followed the rise of operations research and systems 
engineering after World War II. It also grew out of efforts to stem the siloing of knowledge 
within physics, biology, and the social sciences by focusing on the systems qualities of each 
discipline’s key areas of inquiry. See W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, 
NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 82–99 (5th ed. 2003). An organization-as-open-system is a 
series of inputs, processes, and knowledge stocks set within environments of varying levels of 
stability and uncertainty. Organizations respond to the interdependencies between them and 
their environment with a range of strategies, including variation (specialization among subunits 
that subsequently require greater coordination) and enactment, the structuring of activities “as 
loosely coupled systems of repeated, contingent, interlocked behaviors that establish a 
workable level of certainty . . . but also allow variation in interpretation and action as 
organizational members selectively attend to their environments.” Joel A.C. Baum & Tim J. 
Rowley, Companion to Organizations: An Introduction, in COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONS 
1, 6–7 (Joel A. C. Baum ed., 2002). For an account of the variation strategy, see PAUL 
LAWRENCE & JAY LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT (1967). For the enactment 
perspective on organizing, see KARL E. WEICK, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING 
(1969).  
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2074 
that influence what was once viewed as self-contained.51 
Organizations respond to this interdependence through strategies 
such as variation and enactment, which are discussed below. 
Through these responses, organizations allow risks to accumulate 
and make predictable mistakes. 
The turn to open systems analysis was the Cambrian moment in 
organization theory, launching several projects to explain the 
organization’s struggles to adapt to and survive within its 
environment.52 Each has its own way of navigating the paradox of 
organizing, which received a good amount of attention midcentury. 
The paradox is twofold. First, the bureaucratic structures that are 
formed to address problems have unintended consequences.53 
Second, any solutions experience an uneasy duality as they are used 
to control, while at the same time they are influenced by, their 
institutional environment.54 This means that for organizing to occur, 
calculable manipulation and contingent embeddedness must 
coexist.55 Two of the most important bodies of work on the 
organizational roots of crises, normal accident theory and enacted 
sensemaking, emerged directly from the open systems perspective.56 
Its concern with information flows and their self-limiting qualities  is 
important for understanding the post-Valdez regulation of crisis 
through contingency planning.  
                                                
 51. W. Richard Scott, Reflections on a Half-Century of Organizational Sociology, 30 
ANN. REV. OF SOC. 1, 4–5 (2004). 
 52. See, e.g., Mie Augier, James G. March & Bilian Ni Sullivan, Notes on the Evolution of 
a Research Community: Organization Studies in Anglophone North America, 1945–2000, 16 
ORG. SCI. 85 (2005); James G. March, Continuity and Change in Theories of Organizational 
Action, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 278 (1996); William McKinley, Mark A. Mone & Gyewan Moon, 
Determinants and Development of Schools in Organization Theory, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 634 
(1999). 
 53. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. 
SOC. REV. 894, 895 (1936). 
 54. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure 
as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341 (1977). 
 55. See Philip Selznick, Foundations of the Theory of Organizations, 13 AM. SOC. REV. 
25, 34–35 (1948). 
 56. See, e.g., CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK 
TECHNOLOGIES (1999); Barbara Czarniawska, Karl Weick: Concepts, Style and Reflection, 53 
SOC. REV. 267, 271–272 (2005). Both of these perspectives add to our understanding of crisis 
because they speak to different kinds of threats to the form and structure of a social system. See 
Timothy Hynes & Pushkala Prasad, Patterns of ‘Mock Bureaucracy’ in Mining Disasters: An 
Analysis of the Westray Coal Mine Explosion, 34 J. MGMT. STUD. 601, 602 (1997).  
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Wielding the organization-as-open-system to implement an 
emergency response involves overcoming the paradox of organizing. 
The assembly of “ongoing interdependent actions into sensible 
sequences”57 is a contradictory enterprise.58 An organization must 
balance exploratory activities, such as discovery and innovation, with 
exploitative activities, such as production and efficiency, keeping 
inertia at bay while fostering economies of scale.59 Existing 
approaches must share a space with attempts to innovate.60 Short-
term performance must be pursued with long-term adaptability in 
mind. Balancing these interests begins with the twin structural 
projects of differentiation and integration: “The act of organizing 
creates distinctions of roles and responsibilities, which must be 
coordinated and integrated to achieve an overall goal.”61  
As with a living organism, an organization develops greater 
complexity as it grows, its parts “requir[ing] increasing mutual 
interdependence.”62 Subunits are created in response to external 
constraints, but they must be pieced together to address certain 
tasks.63 This is complicated by the fact that subunits do not relate to 
one another in a unified way. They exhibit different levels of 
interdependence, and their members develop different attitudes and 
orientations over time.64 Each form of interdependence requires its 
own coordination methods, including standardization, planning, and 
mutual adjustment.65 Whether it is BP, the Coast Guard, a regional 
response team, or a group of rescue workers banding together for 
the first time, an organization must articulate distinctions among its 
members and identify linkages across newly constituted groups in 
                                                
 57. KARL E. WEICK, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING 3 (1979).  
 58. JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY 150 (1967). 
 59. James March, Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. 
SCI. 71, 71 (1991). 
 60. Nelson P. Repenning, Understanding Fire Fighting in New Product Development, 18 
J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 285, 286 (2001). 
 61. Wendy K. Smith & Michael L. Tushman, Managing Strategic Contradictions: A Top 
Management Model for Managing Innovation Streams, 16 ORG. SCI. 522, 526 (2005). 
 62. SCOTT A. SNOOK, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF U.S. BLACK 
HAWKS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ 143 (2000) (quoting HERBERT SPENCER, AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 56 (1904)).  
 63. Id. at 143. 
 64. THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 54–56; LAWRENCE & LORSCH, supra note 50, at 9–
11. 
 65. LAWRENCE & LORSCH, supra note 50, at 9–11. 
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order to overcome its inherent complexity.66 These realities lead to 
predictable errors and oversights.67  
In addition to structural demands, an organization must respond 
to the cognitive68 limits on how its workers, managers, and other 
members experience and interpret their surroundings. There are two 
broad approaches to organizational cognition. First, we can view the 
organization as an information processing system.69 Second, and 
equally important, we can consider how members interpret the 
stream of information entering a system, which depends on the 
environment in which the organization finds itself.70 In either 
approach, the challenge begins with the fact that the properties of a 
complex system cannot be entirely understood by any given person. 
They must rely on schemas, which are templates for “representing 
elements and the relationships between them” in order to 
compensate for cognitive shortcomings by storing information and 
indicating appropriate actions.71 Management teams also set out 
routines or standard operating procedures for the organization, and 
workers develop patterns of interaction in particular settings.72 
Schemas, routines, and fixed categories of behavior have strong 
effects on an organization’s ability to detect and respond to 
unexpected or novel events.73 They can also encourage organizations 
to gradually accept greater amounts of risk.74  
                                                
 66. Marshall Scott Poole & Andrew H. Van de Ven, Using Paradox to Build 
Management and Organizational Theory, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 562 (1989). 
 67. For an example of an organizationally-based accident resulting from the failure of 
each of the coordination mechanisms Thompson describes, see SNOOK, supra note 62, at 154–
173. 
 68. Here, I am distinguishing cognitive processes from more affective and emotional 
processes, focusing on “reasoning and the preconscious grounds of reason: classifications, 
representations, scripts, schemas, production systems, and the like.” Paul J. DiMaggio & 
Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 35 n.10 (1991); see also W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 23 (1995). 
 69. For an overview, see Theresa K. Lant, Organizational Cognition and Interpretation, 
in COMPANION TO ORGANIZATIONS 344 (Joel A.C. Baum ed., 2002). 
 70. Id. at 351–52. 
 71. Kimberly D. Elsbach, Pamela S. Barr & Andrew B. Hargadon, Identifying Situated 
Cognition in Organizations, 16 ORG. SCI. 422, 422 (2005). 
 72. See Stephen R. Barley & Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutionalization and Structuration: 
Studying the Links Between Action and Institution, 18 ORG. STUD. 93, 97–98 (1997). For a 
discussion of how routines lead organizations to uphold inefficient practices in the context of 
industrial accidents, see Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete 
Institutionalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 863 (2010). 
 73. Karl Weick, Organizing and Failures of Imagination, 8 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 425, 
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To find out whether an organization will have difficulty 
responding to a crisis, we focus on the complex, open system and 
how it comes to know and interpret information from its 
environment; how it stores knowledge in procedures, norms, rules, 
and other sources of cognition that transcend the individual; and 
how patterns of understanding form among its actors as well as 
across organizations. These structural and cognitive considerations 
inform how organizations invite and intensify disaster. The BP oil 
spill provides a dramatic example of how the organizational roots of 
crisis are reproduced during a response action.  
III. THE ILL-FATED MACONDO WELL: AN INDUSTRIAL CRISIS 
I need not take much space to return to the devastation that 
befell the Gulf region, a diverse ecosystem that includes everything 
from sperm whales to fishing villages,75 in April 2010. On April 20, 
there was an explosion on an offshore oil platform known as the 
Deepwater Horizon, forty-eight miles southeast of the Mississippi 
River.76 The dynamically stabilized (not anchored to the seabed) 
platform, built by Hyundai, owned by Transocean,77 and leased to 
BP, sat partially submerged about 5,000 feet above the sea floor.78 
This is by no means an uncommon scene in the Gulf of Mexico: 
                                                                                                           
431–33 (2005). 
 74. Diane Vaughan, Theorizing Disaster: Analogy, Historical Ethnography, and the 
Challenger Accident, 5 ETHNOGRAPHY 315, 340 (2004). 
 75. ROWAN JACOBSEN, SHADOWS ON THE GULF: A JOURNEY THROUGH OUR LAST 
GREAT WETLAND 92 (2011). 
 76. For book-length accounts of the disaster, see JOEL ACHENBACH, A HOLE AT THE 
BOTTOM OF THE SEA: THE RACE TO KILL THE BP OIL GUSHER (2011); BOB CAVNAR, 
DISASTER ON THE HORIZON: HIGH STAKES, HIGH RISKS, AND THE STORY BEHIND THE 
DEEPWATER WELL BLOWOUT (2010); WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING, 
BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN 
AMERICA (2011); PETER LEHNER & BOB DEANS, IN DEEP WATER: THE ANATOMY OF A 
DISASTER, THE FATE OF THE GULF, AND ENDING OUR OIL ADDICTION (2010). 
 77. Of the companies with a stake in the exploratory drilling of the Macondo well, 
Transocean Ltd. is most consistent in its efforts to deflect responsibility for the blowout, 
focusing in its internal investigation on BP’s risk-magnifying decisions and Halliburton’s failure 
to ensure the integrity of the cement used to secure steel pipe against the sides of the wellbore. 
BP’s internal investigation was more circumspect. See TRANSOCEAN LTD., MACONDO WELL 
INCIDENT: TRANSOCEAN INVESTIGATION REPORT VOLUME I (June 2011), available at 
http://www.deepwater.com/_filelib/FileCabinet/pdfs/ 00_TRANSOCEAN_Vol_1.pdf.  
 78. CUTLER CLEVELAND, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL (C. MICHAEL HOGAN & 
PETER SAUNDRY eds., 2010), available at http://www.eoearth.org/article/ 
Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill?topic=50364. 
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there are 1,900 ultra-deepwater leases in the region, 272 of which 
have been drilled.79 Each requires drilling at depths greater than 
5,000 feet.80 The Deepwater Horizon joined this eerie skyline in 
February 2010, connecting to a well roughly one mile below the 
surface using several thousand feet of pipe, after another rig, the 
Marianas, was damaged by a hurricane.81  
From the platform, workers carried out operations through the 
pipe, which is called a riser. Their tasks were enormous: Send a drill 
bit down the riser into a metal box on the sea floor, which then drills 
into the sediment. Follow the drill bit with drilling mud, a mixture 
of water, clay, and other substances, circulating it down the riser and 
back up to the platform to bring rock to the surface and lubricate the 
drillbit.82 Gradually insert steel casings into the well as drilling 
continues, cementing them to surrounding rock at various stages in 
order to keep them in place.83 These and other tasks, at such depths, 
demand some of the most complex work carried out by any industry. 
In order to accomplish such tasks, BP and other owners and 
operators need to develop technologies to withstand very low 
temperatures; near the seafloor, ice crystals form around methane 
molecules, creating hydrates that can clog pipes and equipment.84 
Technology is also needed to combat exceedingly high pressures in 
various ways.85 Much of the work is done using remotely operated 
vehicles. The semisubmersible rig holds its ground using eight 7,000 
horsepower thrusters and GPS technology “so precise that its drills 
[can] hit a specific spot on the ocean floor, just inches in diameter, 
but located nearly a mile below.”86  
Of greatest concern is that there will be a blowout, which is a 
loss of control over drilling fluids leading to the release of oil or gas 
to surrounding waters.87 The dangers were well-known by the 
                                                
 79. CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41262, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf. 
 80. Id. 
 81. LEHNER & DEANS, supra note 76, at 6; ACHENBACH, supra note 76, at 14. 
 82. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at 28–31. 
 83. Id. at 28–30. 
 84. PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22990, GAS HYDRATES: RESOURCE 
AND HAZARD 1 (2008).  
 85. HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 79. 
 86. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at x. 
 87. MARC HUMPHRIES, ROBERT PIROG & GENE WHITNEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40645, U.S. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: PROSPECTS AND PROCESSES 24 (2010). 
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industry, including BP.88 For example, prior to the Deepwater 
Horizon’s demise, there were forty-four notable blowouts 
worldwide. This included eleven blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico, 
occurring at a rate of roughly one every four years.89 Blowout 
preventer failures were also common. A blowout preventer is a giant 
piece of equipment that is supposed to seal around a wellhead in the 
event of an uncontrolled fluid event. A study by the Minerals 
Management Service identified 117 failures during a two-year period 
on the Outer Continental Shelf.90 Some of the environmental review 
documents covering the area of the Macondo well gave strangely 
prescient estimates for the size of a potential well blowout and the 
length of time necessary to drill a relief well, and discussed problems 
presented by methane hydrates and other deepwater drilling 
realities.91 But none of the firms with a stake in Mississippi Canyon 
Block 252, Lease Sale 206, were prepared for what happened on 
April 20. 
At the bottom of the Gulf, far below the Deepwater Horizon oil 
platform, sat the well’s blowout preventer (BOP). Should an oil or 
gas well experience too much pressure, this device, which contains a 
series of valves weighing several hundred tons, is supposed to be 
activated.92 There are several backup systems on BOPs that can 
respond to a number of contingencies. Each of them failed to engage 
the BOP on April 20, when methane gas escaped from the well and 
rapidly ascended through the drill column, ballooning in size as it 
neared the surface.93 It crashed through several seals before 
                                                
 88. For example, BP suffered a blowout on a gas platform in Azerbaijan in 2008. Similar 
to the Macondo well blowout, the accident was blamed on a “bad cement job” by 
Halliburton, a contractor on both projects. Confidential Cable from Embassy Baku, 
Azerbaijan: BP Downbeat on 2009 Shah Deniz Phase Two Progress (Jan. 15, 2009), available 
at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BAKU30 (“BP has restarted oil 
production from CA and is about to start re-injecting gas again in the Central Azeri field. It 
has closed off a ‘few suspect wells’ from which they think a bad cement job caused the leaking 
gas . . . .”). 
 89. Houck, supra note 37, at 11,034. 
 90. PER HOLAND, SINTEF, RELIABILITY OF SUBSEA BOP SYSTEMS FOR DEEPWATER 
APPLICATION, PHASE II DW 11–12 (1999). 
 91. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GULF OF MEXICO 
DEEPWATER OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 9, II-3, II-16 
(2000); BP, BP GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN 533 (2009) 
[hereinafter BP REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN] available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/ 
BPGoMspillresponseplan.pdf.  
 92. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 92–93. 
 93. Id. at 131–32, 137–38, 146, 149–50, 159–67, 273. There were also failures of the 
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exploding, causing chaos and fires to break out on the rig. Of the 
126 people operating on the platform, a tiny floating city, 115 
evacuated.94 A search for the remaining eleven persons was called off 
three days later. The rig sank to the bottom of the Gulf, and the 
giant pipe that connected the Deepwater Horizon to the wellhead 
collapsed into the sea.  
Three days later, remotely operated vehicles scanned the riser 
and discovered two leaks.95 Thus began one of the most difficult 
emergency response efforts since the dawn of the fossil fuel 
economy. It involved at its height over 6,000 vessels, millions of feet 
of boom, 37,000 personnel, seventeen staging areas in four states, 
and a “Unified Command” encompassing over a dozen federal 
agencies.96 Several attempts to stop the leak failed, followed by a 
promising procedure in June in which a cap was placed over the 
BOP after giant shears severed it from the riser.97 The operation 
allowed BP to recover some oil from a containment system attached 
to the BOP. A number of valves were then closed on the cap, 
pending tests for pressure, hydrate formation, and other indicators.98 
On July 15, eighty-six days after the release began, crude oil stopped 
flowing into the Gulf.99  
We will be grappling with the extent of the devastation for some 
time. To begin with, the size of the spill is the subject of much 
controversy. The Coast Guard initially estimated a leak of 1,000 
barrels of oil per day.100 A National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) scientist later encouraged Unified 
Command to raise this estimate to 5,000 barrels per day on April 
28.101 That figure remained until late May, when estimates between 
20,000 and 100,000 barrels per day were given during congressional 
testimony.102 Part of the reason for the disparity in estimates lies in 
                                                                                                           
cement at the base of the well and the drilling mud in the well to contain hydrocarbon 
pressure. Id. at 115–21. 
 94. Id. at 3, 17, 131. 
 95. Id. at 131–32. 
 96. CLEVELAND, supra note 78. 
 97. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145–46, 
148–50, 157–60, 161–67. 
 98. Id. at 161–67. 
 99. Id. at 165. 
 100. Id. at 133. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 146–47. 
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the methods used to estimate the size of the spill.103 Nevertheless, to 
release more oil than the Macondo well sent into the Gulf would 
require the work of a national army, such as when Iraqi forces 
opened and set fire to 700 wells as they retreated from Kuwait in 
1991.104  
The disaster defied many confident claims that BP made to 
regulators prior to the spill, thus unveiling the symbolic nature of 
environmental review. BP’s Regional Oil Spill Response Plan for the 
Gulf, approved by the U. S. Minerals Management Service (MMS) in 
July 2009, reveals the faulty logic involved in contingency plans. The 
bureaucracies that promulgate these documents are only effective 
during periods of continuous and stable operation. Because crises 
occur too infrequently to allow an organization to gauge risk, there 
is a tendency to lock in existing routines, which are an organization’s 
primary tool for simplifying decisions, and interpret past success as 
evidence of their adequacy.105 Organizations do so using “fantasy 
documents,” which are plans for events that are not perceived as 
credible threats and that rarely test the plans’ unrealistic models for 
how organizations behave under stress.106  
BP and the MMS engaged in such planning. They assumed the 
likelihood of a catastrophic blowout was not significant, waiving 
BOP plans. Procedures and equipment for response to a worst-case 
blowout were deemed readily available. BP’s response plan spoke of 
“significant mechanical recovery capacity.”107 While the projected 
worst-case blowout would pump 250,000 barrels per day into the 
Gulf, BP’s plan arrived at a capacity to recover 491,000 barrels of oil 
per day.108 By June 2010, its skimming capacity reached 900 barrels 
per day.109 Another benign assumption involved the chance that oil 
could reach the Louisiana coast. BP’s plan assumed a twenty-one 
                                                
 103. Id. at 147. 
 104. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at 13. 
 105. Lee Clarke & James F. Short, Jr., Social Organization and Risk: Some Current 
Controversies, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 375, 392–93 (1993). 
 106. Lee Clarke & Charles Perrow, Prosaic Organizational Failure, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENTIST 1040 (1996). These documents have common characteristics: they deal with new or 
scaled-up systems such as deepwater drilling, use successfully implemented blueprints for 
simpler contingencies, cover a wide range of events with every possible contingency assumed 
known, and speak to multiple, skeptical audiences by employing benign assumptions. LEE 
CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER (1999). 
 107. BP REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 91, at 504-48. 
 108. Id. at 509. 
 109. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76, at 14. 
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percent chance that this would happen within a month of a 
blowout.110 Crude oil reached the state nine days after the blowout.  
Such estimates were presented despite the fact that the fate and 
transport of oil released a mile under the surface is beyond the reach 
of dispersion modeling. Yet planning proceeded, relying on past 
successes (such as the use of containment domes for shallow water 
leaks after Hurricane Katrina); hypothetically scaling up procedures 
for shallow water or surface spills and ignoring subsurface realities of 
deepwater drilling; assuming away multiple stressors that accompany 
a worst-case scenario (shoreline threats, adverse effects on marine 
life, uncertain authority over decisions, personnel changes) and 
neglecting to determine how a responsible party would act under 
such stress; preapproving dispersants based on the assumption that a 
response action would be limited in time and space; treating the 
BOP as a failsafe even though it included one, not two blind shear 
rams; and encouraging the kinds of rigidities of perception that we 
find in organizational settings. Aided by the self-deceiving quality of 
fantasy plans, the broader mindset in the petroleum industry, even 
after the Gulf oil spill was underway, was that “[t]his was simply an 
event that could not happen.”111 
Media saturation and Web 2.0 took the Macondo well blowout, 
and the fire, collapse, and riser leaks that followed, and seared them 
into our collective consciousness. Traffic to a live feed of one of the 
leaks, taken by camera-mounted remotely operated vehicles and 
available on the Internet one month after the blowout, crashed the 
House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global 
Warming’s website.112 The “spillcam,” as it was called, adorned cable 
news broadcasts, often next to dreary updates that moved along the 
crawl at the bottom of the screen. At one point, the spillcam caught 
an eel as it drifted in for a closer look before darting away to 
safety.113  
In the ensuing weeks, the spillcam, and interpretations of the 
images it captured, mediated the efforts of BP (the responsible party) 
and a vast architecture of laws and regulations that lumbered into 
                                                
 110. Id. at 54. 
 111. Houck, supra note 37, at 11033. 
 112. CLEVELAND, supra note 78. 
 113. Eel Checks Out Deepwater Oil Leak, THE GUARDIAN (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2010/jun/10/eel-deepwater-horizon-oil-
leak. 
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action. We learned plenty during the 103 days before the well was 
effectively “killed,” as the Coast Guard and other agencies worked 
closely with BP to invent responses “on the fly.”114 The most 
disquieting lesson, in an age where natural, man-made, and na-
tech115 crises occur with great frequency and where terrorism has 
muscled its way alongside the hurricanes and accidents of old as an 
object of legislative reform, is how slowly the law learns from its 
experience with the organizational factors that magnify and prolong 
disasters. Organizational breakdown was clear, pervasive, and 
predictable before and during the oil well blowout.116 Some of the 
lessons from the BP oil spill have a ring of familiarity to students of 
disasters, such as the loss of the shuttles Challenger and Columbia 
and the events of 9/11. Yet lawmakers undertheorize the 
importance of organizations in environmental regulation, particularly 
during times of crisis.  
The aftermath of the spill signifies a rush to remedy what are 
perceived as the standard contributors to crisis. To avoid conflicts of 
interest between the Outer Continental Shelf leasing program and 
staff charged with policing oil and gas operations, the lead oversight 
agency (the Minerals Management Service) was split into three 
distinct bureaus and consolidated under the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement.117 Certain categorical 
exclusions from environmental review were eliminated.118 Through 
                                                
 114. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Stopping the Spill: the Five-Month Effort to Kill the Macondo Well 1 (Staff Working Paper No. 6, 
2011) [hereinafter Working Paper No. 6], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Containment%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
 115. Stacy Young, Lina Balluz & Josephine Malilay, Natural and Technologic Hazardous 
Material Releases During and After Natural Disasters: A Review, 322 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 3 
(2004). 
 116. In addition to the overconfidence encouraged by the creation of facility response 
plans, pre-blowout dynamics included atrophy of vigilance, normalization of risk, and parallel 
processing. FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 76.  
 117. U.S. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3299, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU 
OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=324
75; Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 
Enforcement and Regulation, to all BOEMRE district employees 1–4 (2010); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 
2010). 
 118. Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Mgmt., Enforcement and Regulation, to Walter Cruickshank, Deputy Director, Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Mgmt., Enforcement and Regulation 1 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
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rulemaking and notices to lessees, the Department of Interior sought 
to impose new redundancies of control, information disclosure 
requirements regarding blowout preventer functionality, operator 
and drilling safety regulations, and third-party equipment 
verification.119 There were calls to enhance training and recruit a 
proper cadre of inspectors.120 Bills before Congress would extend 
many of these fixes.121 In addition to these reforms, the presidential 
                                                
 119. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and 
Environmental Management Systems: Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,609, 63,610 (Oct. 15, 
2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (final rule requiring operators to “integrate a 
comprehensive [Safety and Environmental Management System] program into the 
management of their [Outer Continental Shelf] operations”); Oil and Gas and Sulphur 
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf – Increased Safety Measures for Energy 
Development on the Outer Continental Shelf: Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,345 (Oct. 14, 
2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (strengthening regulations for subsea and surface 
blowout preventers, well casing and cementing, secondary intervention, unplanned 
disconnects, recordkeeping, and well completion); BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO. 2010-N10, 
NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 1–2 (2010) (requiring submission of information demonstrating that an 
operator using BOPs “has access to and can deploy surface and subsea containment resources 
that would be adequate to promptly respond to a blowout or other loss of well control”); 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: THE 
DRILLING SAFETY RULE 1–2, available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=45792 (describing BOEM’s interim Drilling 
Safety Rule imposing requirements on well bore integrity and well control equipment and 
procedures); MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO. 2010-N05, 
NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS): INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON 
THE OCS 1, 2–6 (2010) (implementing reporting requirements for “BOP stacks and loss of 
well control events,” as well as third party certification, new testing requirements, and well 
design requirements); MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO. 
2010-N06, NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS 
LEASES, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS): INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT 
OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE OCS 2–3 (2010) (requiring submission 
of information to MMS on potential well blowout and worst-case discharge scenarios). 
 120. Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement, 
BOEMRE Strengthens Offshore Inspections Program (June 13, 2011). 
 121. See, e.g., H.R. 1890, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring applicants for exploration plans 
or development plans in the Outer Continental Shelf to submit an oil spill containment and 
clean-up plan); H.R. 1870, 112th Cong. (2011) (creating new entities within the Department 
of Interior); H.R. 1664, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending requirements for oil spill response 
plans and water quality monitoring); H.R. 1393, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring mandatory 
monthly inspections of offshore drilling facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf); H.R. 1229, 
112th Cong. (2011) (as passed by the House, May 11, 2011) (requiring operators to 
demonstrate compliance with safety systems, including blowout prevention and oil spill 
response and containment before the Dept. of Interior issuance of drilling permits); H.R. 
3534, 111th Cong. (2010) (as passed by the House, July 30, 2010) (requiring use of safe well 
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commission added that coordination should be improved among 
high-level officials and that more extensive procedures for Spills of 
National Significance should be adopted.122 Their report echoes 
earlier calls for a “culture of safety” among operators, through use of 
a “safety case” instead of a prescriptive approach.123 Better 
coordination, increasingly intricate procedures, and more data with 
oversight by independent, better-trained staff is the order of the day. 
IV. NCP V. DWH: THE RESPONSE ARCHITECTURE’S IGNORANCE 
OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Such changes mark the tail end of twenty years of regulatory 
accretion. The federal response to disaster during this time has been 
to create organizations that focus on civil contingencies, new or 
reorganized bureaucracies demanding greater coordination, 
enhanced procedures, and more data sharing. This began in earnest 
with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP),124 published in response to the Torrey 
Canyon oil spill in 1968, amended to cover hazardous substance spill 
response, and revised after Exxon Valdez to reflect provisions of the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990.125 The NCP creates a number of bodies 
to carry out response functions at the national, regional, and area 
levels.126 A National Response Team cobbles together sixteen 
                                                                                                           
control technologies and practices for drilling); S. 3516, 111th Cong. (2010) (as reported by 
S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, July 28, 2010) (reforming the regulatory 
oversight of the Interior Department with regard to offshore drilling in the Outer Continental 
Shelf). 
 122. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 267–68. 
 123. Id. at 223. 
 124. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 
300 (2010). For a summary of the NCP, see National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2011). 
 125. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (The purpose of the NCP is “to provide organizational 
structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of 
hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants.”). Presidential creation of the NCP is 
required by § 311(d) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act”), 33 
U.S.C. § 1321(d) as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, and by 
Section 105 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2006), as amended by the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The 
President delegated the authority to amend the NCP to the administrator of the EPA. Exec. 
Order, No. 12777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (Oct. 22, 1991). 
 126. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.210(a)–(c), 300.105(c) (2010). The NRT does not become 
actively involved in a response action that is manageable by Regional Response Teams (RRT), 
instead offering policy, guidance, and coordination efforts, for instance in the creation of 
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agencies and is chaired by the EPA and vice-chaired by the Coast 
Guard.127 Regional Response Teams mirror the National Response 
Team in composition. They function at the regional level and 
actively engage in response efforts.128 Area Committees required by 
the Clean Water Act also include members from industry and are the 
primary functional units of response planning, implementing more 
specific and detailed plans for a physical response to oil spills.129 For 
the Gulf region, the Area Committee formulated the Area 
Contingency Plan, or “One Gulf Plan,” a coordinated effort to 
envision and prepare for events as they might occur on the ground.  
An On-Scene Coordinator directs and oversees response efforts 
and coordinates all other efforts at the release site.130 When a spill 
poses a substantial threat to public health or welfare, the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard may classify it as a Spill of National 
Significance and appoint someone to coordinate even greater federal 
involvement. The National Incident Commander assumes the role of 
On-Scene Coordinator and oversees all levels of response.131 For the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, Admiral Thad Allen filled this role by 
forming a Unified Area Command, an ad hoc body to supervise the 
broader effort,132 while three Incident Command posts in Houma, 
                                                                                                           
Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs). Because of the severity and cross-district nature of the BP 
oil spill, the NRT was activated as an emergency response team as part of the nationalized 
response. 40 C.F.R. § 300.110(j)(1)(i–ii) (2010). 
 127. During a response action, the chair is the agency providing an On-Scene 
Coordinator. The Coast Guard provides On-Scene Coordinators for oil discharges within 
coastal waters and was therefore the NRT’s chair for the Deepwater Horizon response. 40 
C.F.R § 300.120(a)(1) (2010). 
 128. 40 C.F.R § 300.205(b) (2010). RRTs are limited to regional resources of 
represented federal agencies (Coast Guard vessels, for example). 40 C.F.R § 300.115(f) 
(2010). However, RRTs also include state and local representation. 40 C.F.R §§ 300.115(a),  
300.180 (2010). The RRT is composed of a standing team of members of participating federal 
agencies, state governments, local governments, and incident-specific teams when the RRT is 
activated for a response. Membership in incident-specific teams is dictated by the nature of the 
incident. 40 C.F.R. § 300.115(b)–(e) (2010).   
 129. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.205(c), 300.210(c) (2010). 
 130. 40 C.F.R. § 300.120(a) (2010). For coastal releases, the Coast Guard has 
predesignated On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs). OSCs collect information and communicate it 
to appropriate persons and agencies as well as the public. 40 C.F.R § 300.135(c)–(n), 
300.155(a)–(c) (2010). 
 131. 40 C.F.R. § 300.323(c) (2010). The OSC continues to operate after installation of 
an NIC, although their relationship and defined roles are not well-defined in the NCP. 
 132. The organizations involved in the Deepwater Horizon response’s Unified Command 
included BP, Transocean, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management Service, NOAA, EPA, 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, Department of Defense, Fish 
and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Department of State, U.S. Geological Survey, and 
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Louisiana; Houston, Texas; and Mobile, Alabama made tactical and 
operational decisions.133  
The NCP is the federal government’s “playbook,”134 a massive 
assignment of procedures, roles, equipment levels, techniques, and 
schedules. It mirrors the perceived lessons of disasters like Exxon 
Valdez as it consolidates expertise, expands procedures, and assigns 
responsibilities. The events of 9/11 ushered in a more gargantuan 
surge of reorganization, whose premise bears a striking resemblance 
to the justification for the NCP. First, bring together disparate, 
diverse units, this time under the Department of Homeland 
Security.135 Second, increase coordination among agencies and 
branches, including among fifty-six FBI field offices, and acquire and 
share a greater amount of information. Lastly, build out standard 
operating procedures to meet an expanding set of contingencies in 
an evolving threat environment, such as by updating protocols to 
address multiple or suicide hijackings as opposed to traditional 
hijackings.136  
Below, I discuss what is neglected in these efforts, which 
represent the state-of-the-art in environmental crisis management. 
The Macondo well blowout illustrates crucial, cutting-edge problems 
in organization theory, particularly interorganizational limits to 
rationality and how to manage organizational cognition. In the Gulf 
of Mexico in the summer of 2010, the post-9/11 emergency 
                                                                                                           
OSHA.  
 133. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 4 (Staff Working Paper No. 2, 2010) 
[hereinafter Working Paper No. 2], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
 134. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 30 (1980). 
 135. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-5 
(2003) [hereinafter HSPD-5] (making DHS the principal federal agency for “terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies” and outlining agency obligations). 
 136. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) “provide[s] a consistent 
nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments,” a single system of 
management for domestic emergencies. HSPD-5, supra note 135, at § 15. NIMS Component 
IV codifies the Incident Command System, itself a small bureaucracy with command, 
operations, planning, logistics, and finance sections. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM § IV.A.2 (2008) [hereinafter NIMS]. Together, 
HSPD-5 and NIMS lay out the response architecture that prosecuted what officials understood 
as a “war” against the Macondo well. They invoke the structures and procedures of the NCP 
and require assembly of a Unified Command for multi-jurisdictional response. NIMS § 
IV.A.2.a(2). 
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response laws were set in motion. Government organized teams of 
scientists and engineers who “took a crash course in petroleum 
engineering and were able over time to provide substantive oversight 
of BP.”137 BP worked on building “novel devices” that they 
confidently lowered into the Gulf while the government “had to 
mobilize personnel on the fly.”138 We see two strands of activity here: 
design/build of new containment methods and a lurching toward 
appropriate oversight, for which the National Response Framework 
provided a limited map. The insights of organization theory help 
explain the “failure of response systems to improve alongside 
advances in exploration technology”139 that haunted the response 
effort. This Article discusses six dynamics that were reproduced by 
the response system awakened by the BP oil spill. These dynamics, 
which contributed to the failure to more swiftly rein in the blowout, 
go beyond the narratives that dominate standard regulatory accounts 
of accidents. They point to how multiagency response can intensify 
the paradox of organizing.  
A. Interorganizational Dynamics 
1. Anarchy 
The NCP and other contingency planning efforts intensify the 
challenges of balancing differentiation and integration while tending 
to organizational cognition. This is true by virtue of the inter-
organizational anarchies that they create and try to govern. No 
matter how many standard operating procedures are built out or 
agencies are consolidated and told to share information, disaster 
response will occur under conditions of dramatic uncertainty. For 
example, during the BP oil spill, the use of dispersants to break oil 
into trillions of tiny droplets to keep much of it from reaching 
coastal wetlands had to be approved for subsea use near the 
wellhead.140 This had to proceed with little or no data on 
environmental persistence, sublethal effects (such as endocrine 
                                                
 137. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 1. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Memorandum, supra note 15, at 13. 
 140. Press Release, Restore the Gulf, Coast Guard and EPA Approve Use of Dispersant 
Subsea in Further Effort to Prevent Oil from Reaching U.S. Shoreline (May 15, 2010), 
available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/05/15/coast-guard-and-eps-
approve-use-dispersant-subsea-further-effort-prevent-oil-reac/. 
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disruption), or toxicity.141 Dispersants were preauthorized as part of 
the NCP but without guidance as to the appropriate amount or 
duration of use.142 Decisions about what became high-volume, 
subsea dispersant application were made in narrow time frames 
without the chance to gather sufficient data.143 Responders also 
wanted to place boom along coastal ecosystems and tried to direct its 
placement where it would be most efficient.144 But because coastal 
areas change with great frequency, determining specific booming 
maps ahead of a crisis is impossible.145 These and other sources of 
ambiguity rendered goals unclear at a number of points during the 
war on the Macondo well.  
Well control and containment, which were supervised by MMS 
officials, and later the Unified Command,146 provide examples of the 
unclear goals that informed the response. At first, the concern was 
well integrity.147 BP workers delayed intervention with remotely 
operated vehicles for twenty hours because they were worried that 
closing the BOP stack and shutting in the well might cause an 
underground blowout, where vast amounts of hydrocarbons would 
escape into surrounding rock.148 Other times, decisions were guided 
by goals such as positioning ships at a safe distance from the fire or 
by concerns for human health due to concentrations of volatile 
organic compounds near response vessels or the shoreline.149  
                                                
 141. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 144–45, 
270–71; Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, The Use 
of Surface and Subsea Dispersants During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 1–2 (Staff 
Working Paper No. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Working Paper No. 4], available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Dispersants
%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
 142. Working Paper No. 4, supra note 141, at 4; see DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 271. 
 143. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 144–45, 
270–71. 
 144. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 18 (Staff Working Paper No. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter Working Paper No. 2], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf. 
 145. Id. at 21; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 
154. 
 146. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 1. 
 147. Id. at 3. 
 148. Id. at 3–4. 
 149. Id. at 4. 
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Objectives shifted over time. After the “top kill” method failed 
to stop the flow of oil, BP concluded that it did not work because 
mud pumped into the well had moved through collapsed rupture 
disks and sideways into the rock, rather than remaining in the well 
and pushing hydrocarbons back into the reservoir.150 This caused 
capping methods, including the capping stack that ultimately 
stopped the flow of oil into the Gulf, to be shelved because of well 
integrity concerns.151 Later, when the capping stack was again 
considered a viable option, monitoring protocols had to be 
developed, combining visual, seismic, sonar, wellhead pressure, and 
other data.152 This raised several questions: Would well integrity tests 
signal the need to reopen the spill to avoid an underground 
blowout? What threshold would signal the need to take such an 
action? And how would it be decided?153 
In addition to goal ambiguity, and despite the militaristic 
hierarchy set in place by the NCP and other documents, response 
participants and their assigned roles varied considerably over time. 
The federal oversight structure matured through late June.154 Early 
on, MMS focused its attention on safety risks and ensuring 
conformity with MMS regulations, not on suggesting options or 
determining their likelihood of success.155 The Coast Guard did not 
take charge of the scene or even lead the fire fighting effort, as 
neither were part of its primary mission.156 Eventually, a rudimentary 
chain of command formed, with BP detailing new procedures, MMS 
and Coast Guard staff in Houston identifying and mitigating 
hazards, procedures being forwarded to the Unified Command in 
Louisiana with an MMS Gulf of Mexico director reviewing those 
procedures, and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator giving final 
approval.157 It was not until two months into the crisis that a 
formalized government review process was in place, with the U.S. 
Geological Survey and teams from several national laboratories 
providing information and analysis.158 Additional teams of scientists 
                                                
 150. Id. at 20–21. 
 151. Id. at 22. 
 152. Id. at 2829. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 1415, 2425. 
 155. Id. at 6. 
 156. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 130. 
 157. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 6. 
 158. Id. at 14–15. 
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not envisioned by the response plans, such as the Well Integrity 
Team and the Flow Rate Technical Group, were formed rapidly.159  
Throughout this time period, there was little clarity as to the 
extent and nature of government oversight with respect to certain 
classes of issues.160 Role ambiguity abounded as positions and 
responsibilities were grafted onto existing frameworks.161 
Organizational charts for the Unified Area Command and Incident 
Command posts, for example, show employees of BP scattered 
across the command structure in roles such as waste management 
and environmental assessment.162 Admiral Allen, who decided to 
focus on monitoring high-level strategy and political issues himself, 
defined the role of the National Incident Commander on the job.163 
From existing procedures it was unclear how he and the On-Scene 
Coordinator should divide responsibility.164 The National and 
Regional Response Teams were activated and later marginalized, 
becoming report-to instead of decision-making bodies.165 Agency 
administrators took on evolving responsibilities and issued joint 
directives.166 Industry leaders from firms other than BP assumed an 
active role in mid-to-late June, providing advice on conference calls 
of thirty or more.167 State-level actors did not know how to interact 
with the NCP, which is more interventionist than the federal relief 
provided under the Stafford Act (which provides funding and 
coordination when an emergency is declared at the state level).168 
The essential technologies of emergency response, which 
included the instruments and techniques of well control and available 
                                                
 159. Id. at 1314, 2728. 
 160. Id. at 13–15, 24–27. 
 161. Id.  
 162. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 134. 
 163. Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 5. 
 164. Id. at 3–6. 
 165. Id. at 8–9. 
 166. See generally DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 
ch. 5 (outlining the response to the Gulf Oil Disaster); Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114 
(outlining the effort to contain the Macondo blowout). 
 167. See, e.g., Thad Allen, Nat’l Incident Commander for the Deepwater BP Oil Spill, 
Press Briefing Regarding the Deepwater BP Oil Spill (June 21, 2010), http:// 
www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/06/21/transcript-press-briefing-national-incident-
commander-june-21-2010 (describing conference calls and the involvement of BP in the 
ongoing containment efforts); DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra 
note 26, at 16162; Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 1415. 
 168. Working Paper No. 2, supra note 144, at 1819. 
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routines and institutionalized modes of conduct, were further ill-
defined.169 Some of the proposed solutions to the well blowout, 
which included cofferdam, top kill, junk shot, capping stack, static 
kill, and collection, were adapted to deepwater use for the first 
time.170 Other more rule-based technologies, such as standard 
operating procedures previously developed and based on well-
defined problems culled from previous crises, were inappropriate for 
this particular spill response, yet the decisions that they facilitated 
allowed other risks to accumulate. For example, the Coast Guard has 
procedures for supporting the fire marshal brought in by a company 
with a rig fire. However, in the chaos surrounding the events before 
the rig’s collapse, no fire marshal was called.171 With no one in 
charge, vessels responding to the fire poured seawater onto its decks 
rather than on the columns supporting the rig.172 As a result, the 
tons of seawater applied to the deck upset the rig’s stability and 
potentially hastened its collapse.173 If the rig had stayed afloat, much 
of the oil would have burned at the surface.  
Later, faith in existing procedures led the Unified Command to 
neglect some of the key operational hazards associated with BP’s 
containment efforts.174 Specifically, as the cofferdam was readied to 
surround the larger of two riser leaks, no effort was made to 
determine how to mitigate hydrate formation within equipment as it 
was being installed.175 There were procedures for dealing with 
hydrates once a containment structure was in place, but not 
before.176 Hydrates accumulated in the cofferdam while it was being 
                                                
 169. See generally DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 
ix; Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Response/Clean-up Technology Research & Development and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
(Staff Working Paper No. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Working Paper No. 7], available at 
http://tinyurl.com/6mkt8cf.  
 170. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145–53; 
Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 716. For depictions of some of the proposed 
solutions to the blowout, see Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 9 (cofferdam), 16 (top 
kill and junk shot), 27 (capping stack), 35 (static kill), and 22 (collection). 
 171. U.S. COAST GUARD, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE EXPLOSION, FIRE, SINKING AND LOSS OF ELEVEN CREW MEMBERS 
ABOARD THE MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT, DEEPWATER HORIZON IN THE GULF OF 
MEXICO 78–79 (2011), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=6700. 
 172. Id. at 78–81. 
 173. Id. at 81–82. 
 174. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 47. 
 175. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 145. 
 176. Id.  
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lowered into the Gulf.177 Because hydrates are lighter than water, 
they rendered the structure buoyant, sending a giant flammable 
dome toward a surface strewn with response vessels.178  
As disaster scholars have repeatedly warned about the 
“incubation period” that precedes crises, the effects of poorly 
defined technologies and an accumulation of errors were similarly 
manifest in the early response efforts in the Gulf. For example, BP 
and other parties tried to control the blowout preventer stack until 
May 5, by which date they were only able to partially close the blind 
shear ram.179 These were largely misdirected efforts because 
Transocean had earlier reconfigured the equipment so that what the 
parties thought was the blind shear ram was actually a test ram.180  
More importantly, the lack of an accurate flow-rate estimate 
hindered use of existing and refined technologies.181 Efforts such as 
placing a cofferdam over a riser leak were known to have little chance 
of success if the flow rate were greater than 15,000 barrels per day.182 
For the top kill, given planned pumping rates, the procedure was not 
likely to work if it were counteracting a 13,000- to 15,000-barrel-
per-day blowout.183 In addition, hydrates are more likely to form on 
equipment as the flow volume increases.184 A ship brought in to 
collect oil from containment structures could process only 15,000 
barrels per day.185 Models of hydrate formation and collection 
abilities proceeded without accurate flow estimates.186 For much of 
May 2010, the only official flow-rate estimate was 5,000 barrels per 
day.187 The flow rate was closer to 60,000 barrels per day.  
There is a decision-making model for environments characterized 
by unclear goals, ill-defined technology, and shifting participation. 
This model challenges the view of organizations as rational entities 
                                                
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 146. 
 179. Id. at 137–38. 
 180. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 8. 
 181. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 146–47; 
Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 11–12. 
 182. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 11–12. 
 183. Id. at 16; DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 
150. 
 184. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL COMM’N REPORT, supra note 26, at 146. 
 185. Working Paper No. 6, supra note 114, at 11–12. 
 186. Id. at 11. 
 187. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2094 
and extends the work of the Carnegie school on bounded 
cognition.188 In it, “[p]roblems, solutions, participants, and choice 
opportunities . . . are frequently uncoupled and recombined in 
organizational settings for reasons of timing and chance rather than 
based on administrative forethought.”189 This occurs under 
conditions of what Cohen, March, and Olsen dub “organized 
anarchy.”190 A primary preoccupation of organizations is to replace 
ambiguous goals with “more specific, proximal, and often procedural 
goal statements” in order to reduce uncertainty.191 How these goals 
are then addressed is contingent: the specific decision-making 
context and choice opportunities that it presents, the participants 
who are assembled, and other characteristics of an organization’s 
structure bring together solutions and problems. New 
institutionalism is largely devoted to studying what happens in these 
settings, as organizationally-defined solutions seek problems in order 
to reduce uncertainty and ensure an organization’s legitimacy.192  
While some scholarship questions how contingent such decisions 
will ultimately be,193 recent work suggests that the model has even 
greater relevance in interorganizational settings. For example, 
Clarke’s study of the regulatory response to a polychlorinated 
biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated office building in Binghamton, New 
York194 and Beamish’s analysis of the Guadalupe Dunes oil spill195 
point to how, in an interagency context, bounded fields of attention, 
indistinct problems, unclear procedures, fluid agency participation, 
and conflicting priorities inform how contamination is addressed and 
how solutions are paired with problems in specific choice situations. 
                                                
 188. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral 
Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253 (1959). 
 189. Thomas D. Beamish, Waiting for Crisis: Regulatory Inaction and Ineptitude and the 
Guadalupe Dunes Oil Spill, 49 SOC. PROBS. 150, 154 (2002). 
 190. Michael D. Cohen, Jarmes G. March & Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972). 
 191. THOMAS BEAMISH, SILENT SPILL: THE ORGANIZATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL CRISIS 
91 (2002) (quoting W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN 
SYSTEMS 274 (1981)). 
 192. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 54. 
 193. Jonathan Bendor, Terry M. Moe & Kenneth W. Shotts, Recycling the Garbage Can: 
An Assessment of the Research Program, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 169 (2001). 
 194. See generally LEE CLARKE, ACCEPTABLE RISK? MAKING DECISIONS IN A TOXIC 
ENVIRONMENT (1989). 
 195. BEAMISH, supra note 191. 
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To improve contingency planning, we must better understand how 
those linkages occur. 
2. Drift 
A second debate that is recast by multiagency response is the 
extent to which an organization is prone to crisis. Turner’s grounded 
theory of the origins of disasters zeroed in on the faulty premises, 
misplaced optimism, and ignored danger signals that contribute to 
an accident during an incubation period.196 Gephart, Shrivastava, and 
others added political and external factors to explain their root 
causes, while Perrow was the first to provide a framework to study 
how certain factors interact.197 Perrow argues that organizations are 
“error-inducing” systems to the extent they exhibit interactive 
complexity (which allows independent failures to combine in 
unforeseen ways) and tight as opposed to loose coupling (which 
allows mistakes or failures to quickly escalate before they are 
understood).198 The basic message of “normal accident” theory is 
that accidents are inherent in the structure and technology of an 
organization. Complexity and coupling render what are at first minor 
technical problems either invisible or incompatible with existing 
categories of inquiry by facility managers. Beginning with the Three 
Mile Island nuclear accident, Perrow distinguishes systems accidents 
from those caused by operator or equipment failure.199  
Like Beamish and Clarke, Perrow relies on a garbage can model 
of decision making for normal accident theory.200 The theory helps 
us build on the basic problem of organizing, that of creating 
organizations that function as a single entity (integration) while 
maintaining enough internal diversity (differentiation) to allow them 
                                                
 196. Turner, supra note 10. 
 197. David Wicks, Institutionalized Mindsets of Invulnerability: Differentiated 
Institutional Fields and the Antecedents of Organizational Crisis, 22 ORG. STUD. 659, 660 
(2001). 
 198. PERROW, supra note 29, at 4–5; Scott D. Sagan, Learning from Normal Accidents, 
17 ORG. & ENV’T. 15, 16–18 (2004). 
 199. Charles Perrow, The President’s Commission and the Normal Accident, in ACCIDENT 
AT THREE MILE ISLAND: THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS 174–76 (David L. Sills, C. Wolf & V. 
Shelanski eds., 1982). 
 200. Charles Perrow, The Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a Theory of Accidents, 2 J. 
CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 212, 216–17 (1994). The garbage can model considers the 
interplay of relatively independent streams of problems, personnel, solutions, and choice 
opportunities. It seeks to understand the influence of organizational structure and design over 
how these streams are linked together. Cohen, March, & Olsen, supra note 190, at 3–4.  
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to respond to the complexity of their environments.201 Normal 
accident theory does so by focusing on the mechanisms used to 
maintain sufficient diversity: (a) establishing hierarchy to consider 
problems at different levels, (b) allowing those with power to use the 
hierarchy to encourage actions they approve of, or (c) creating 
distinct subcultures through use of social pressures.202 Through these 
mechanisms, diversity is enhanced (usually through loose coupling) 
or diminished (usually through tight coupling). Thus, Weick 
suggests that the theory, which began as a technologically 
deterministic account of two common properties of systems, 
concerns social processes as well as technological structures.203  
While Sagan approvingly tested the theory against the Strategic 
Air Command’s operations during the Cold War,204 the theory is 
sometimes criticized for its inadequate falsifiability, as is true of its 
more optimistic counterpart, the theory of high-reliability 
organizations.205 Initially formulated by LaPorte, high-reliability 
theory looks to air traffic control, nuclear powered aircraft carrier 
decks, and submarines and asks how they achieve strong safety 
records in the face of interactive complexity and tight coupling. The 
answer is largely one of group socialization, redundancy, and 
continuous training and simulation.206  
The BP oil spill poses a question to both theories on an inter-
organizational scale: To what extent can contingency planning be 
designed so that it is reliable while avoiding system-level failures? 
The NCP grafts a potentially tightly coupled and interactively 
complex system of decision-making onto environmental hazards, 
where an ill-placed procedure or flow rate estimate can migrate 
through the system and lead to potentially catastrophic outcomes 
(e.g., earlier rig collapse, failed containment efforts, underground 
blowout). Snook’s reconstruction of a friendly fire incident in Iraq 
                                                
 201. Karl E. Weick, Normal Accident Theory as Frame, Link, and Provocation, 17 ORG. & 
ENV’T. 27, 28 (2004). 
 202. Id. at 29. 
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suggests that when we add this multilevel (as well as a temporal) 
dimension to the analysis of accidents, normal accident and high-
reliability theory can be treated as complementary.207 Here is the 
event that Snook, himself a prior victim of friendly fire, analyzed: 
Two army helicopters (UH-60s), based in Turkey, had been 
assigned to land at a village just inside the Iraqi border . . . . The 
helicopters were visible only intermittently on the air force AWACS 
radars because their signals would fade in and out as they landed or 
flew behind mountains. Radios in the army helicopters were 
incompatible with those in the air force fighters. Furthermore, the 
helicopters did not use a different electronic identification code 
when they flew in Iraq from the one they used in Turkey, even 
though all other friendly aircraft did. This discrepancy had 
continued for almost three years of the peace-keeping operation. 
On the morning of the shootdown, two air force F-15 fighter 
planes, accustomed to air-to-air combat at high altitudes, were 
assigned to sweep the secure zone for enemy aircraft. They believed 
that they were the first aircraft in the secure zone that morning, 
and when they spotted the two helicopters on their own radar 
screens, they tried unsuccessfully to identify whether they were 
friend or foe.208  
Confusing the Black Hawks for Mil Mi-24 Hind-Ds, the pilots, after 
attempting visual identification and help from an AWACS crew, 
obliterated the two helicopters with air-to-air missiles.209 Snook 
explains that breakdowns at multiple levels within the no-fly zone led 
to “practical drift,” the “slow, steady uncoupling of local practice 
from written procedure.”210 Karl Weick, whose theoretical work on 
loose coupling inspired important elements of Snook’s theory, 
describes the process of practical drift as follows: 
When a global system is first designed, it is treated as a tightly 
coupled system with safeguards built in to prevent worst-case 
scenarios. When these designs are implemented, they often prove 
unworkable locally. Units adopt their own local variations, which 
                                                
 207. SNOOK, supra note 62. For the importance of these elements, see Samir Shrivastava, 
Karan Sonpar & Federica Pazzaglia, Normal Accident Theory Versus High Reliability Theory: A 
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get perpetuated when new briefers inform new crews how we do 
things around here. With each new generation of briefing, the 
entire system becomes more loosely coupled, and the logic of the 
local task becomes more compelling . . . . What is crucial in this 
ongoing loosening of coordination is that each unit that is 
following its own unique path assumes that all other groups are 
behaving in accord with the original set of established rules. If a 
system that has drifted into locally acceptable procedures suddenly 
becomes tightly coupled, the local adaptations no longer mesh, and 
this produces an incomprehensible catastrophic moment.211 
In this way, a high-reliability system, such as a no-fly zone with fifty 
thousand incident-free hours, can invite a “normal accident.”  
The lessons for contingency planning are manifold. The 
conditions of practical drift within the emergency response system 
set out by the NCP, which may include actions by senior leaders, 
intergroup isolation, and intragroup norms, need to be ferreted out. 
More importantly, Snook shows that additional layers of rules and 
coordination will not prevent the systems dynamics at play and, if 
anything, will only introduce new ways for drift to occur. Rather, we 
need to identify the design features of a “multilevel, multi-task, 
organizational system that will increase the likelihood of 
accomplishing the ‘total task’” when it presents itself.212 Such 
systems design work will need to be cognizant of the three general 
conditions of practical drift: (1) complex organizations that do not 
have the opportunity to learn from trial and error and have a 
corresponding tendency to overdesign, (2) lengthy periods of loose 
coupling “sufficient to generate substantial gaps between globally 
synchronized rules and local subgroup practice,” and (3) moments 
where isolated subgroups become tightly coupled, such as during a 
response action.213 
3. Fire fighting 
So far, I’ve suggested two ways in which a response effort can 
recreate conditions of risk that are similar to those preceding a crisis. 
Interorganizational anarchy abounds, adding contingency to how 
solutions, problems, and choice settings will be aligned. And 
practical drift suggests that even highly scripted contingency 
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operations will introduce new risks, such as when previously isolated 
teams are reassembled (more tightly coupled) during a response 
action. These approaches to crisis mirror the literature’s focus on 
how organizations fail to address novel events, beginning with 
Turner’s account of the incubation period. For example, normal 
accident and high-reliability theory disagree principally over how 
novel events will be managed—will they remain hidden by complex 
technology, defy existing categories of routine action, and 
accumulate unnoticed, or can their effects be muted or designed 
around with sufficient training and preoccupation with error?  
Missing from these debates is an understanding of how non-
novel events lead to or worsen a crisis.214 The response in the Gulf 
set contingency planning in motion under conditions of both 
novelty, where interruptions occur for which an organization lacks 
the appropriate response in its repertoire, and quantity, where 
interruptions threaten the system’s information processing capacity 
and lead to cycles of increased stress and rigidity.215 To design a 
response framework is to appreciate how the two forms of 
interruption interact with the stocks, flows, and feedback loops of 
the system and lead to declining performance. Contingency planning 
often reacts to the novelty of prior crises. It tries to widen conceptual 
categories of response and fields of attention through additional 
standard operating procedures and, along with this enlarged 
repertoire, increases organizational responsibilities.216 At the same 
time, mundane events, nonthreatening in isolation, can produce 
system-level effects in their own way. 
Here are three examples of the accumulation of non-novel events 
during the Gulf oil spill response. The first concerns the use of 
dispersants, which were applied heavily at the spill source, on the 
surface nearby, and in other locations.217 The novelty of their use 
included the fact that while the NCP gives the On-Scene 
Coordinator the authority to authorize use of dispersants, it did not 
schedule their approval for long-term, subsea application.218 Requests 
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from the responsible party and Unified Command for their use had 
to be considered based on operational conditions (such as windows 
of effectiveness for skimming operations), health and safety (such as 
when volatile organic compound surface levels exceeded air 
monitoring limits for a seven-day period), and other factors.219 A 
May 26 directive (followed by a revised directive on June 22) 
curtailed their use but allowed for exemptions to impose limits for 
surface and aerial application.220 The On-Scene Coordinator received 
seventy-four requests for exemption.221 This added a number of 
mundane tasks for the unified response to tend to on a daily basis: 
monitoring aircraft tank levels, recording tank levels on surface 
vessels, sorting and cataloguing records, calculating the dispersant-
to-oil ratio to check whether it fell within a certain range, and other 
efforts, all of which became routine.222 In this way, the development 
of new operational policy in the midst of an emergency response 
included both novel and numerous interruptions that posed different 
system-level risks to the response.  
A second example is an event that occurred toward the end of 
May 2010, when the Administration tripled the federal manpower 
and resources available to the response effort.223 This taxed what was 
at the time a thin-spread force in unforeseen ways. National Incident 
Command staff dramatically increased their purchasing of skimmers 
and boom deployment, some in areas unlikely to be affected.224 The 
spill occurred during a “transfer season” where Coast Guard workers 
were being reassigned to new ports.225 Coast Guard reservists could 
be recalled, but only for a maximum of two, sixty-day intervals in a 
                                                
 219. See id. at 6–10. 
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two year period.226 Other agencies were approached by the National 
Incident Command to see whether they could send additional 
responders. The Coast Guard eventually tripled personnel, keeping 
track of their progress through a daily report, “Status on 
Tripling.”227 Responders concluded that these efforts limited the 
Coast Guard’s ability to conduct other missions within the recovery 
operation.228  
Specific efforts to approve berm-related projects provide a third 
example of a system taxed by non-novel as well as novel events. The 
Army Corps of Engineers offers a general permit—the NOD-2—
covering operations that respond to oil and gas well blowouts.229 
This permit truncates environmental review but with a number of 
important caveats. For example, the project must involve the 
minimum work necessary to respond to the emergency, and it must 
be temporary.230 In mid-May, the Louisiana State Coastal Protection 
and Restoration Authority applied for an NOD-20 permit to build 
offshore sand barrier berms.231 This was another solution not 
contemplated in the contingency plans prior to the spill, novel for its 
scale and for its many unintended effects, about which there was 
little information to gauge the project’s environmental impacts. But 
it was also subject to an environmental review process, involving 
federal and state agencies under more than half a dozen statutes. The 
Corps coordinated review of a revised application through hastily 
organized emails, telephone calls, and written communications 
between agencies prior to a “berm summit” in early June.232 The 
Commission found that such a process strained the capacity of 
emergency response agencies to properly comment on and approve 
what was ultimately a cost-ineffective project that collected only 
1,000 barrels of oil.233  
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These mixtures of novel and non-novel interruptions suggest the 
need to better understand how, together, they tax an emergency 
response system. While a novel event might call for enlarging a 
system’s repertoire of responses, recombining procedures, and 
increasing its resilience to cope with surprises, the number of such 
interruptions can over time degrade or punish a system’s ability to 
enact such solutions. Preparing for how a system will respond to 
interruptions will require models of how such interruptions arrive, 
accumulate, and dissipate, how they impair the execution of 
necessary cognitive processes, and the role of feedback loops in 
triggering the system’s declining performance. 
We should pay particular attention to how a system can descend 
into “fire fighting,” a condition of crisis management involving the 
interaction of system stocks and flows.234 For example, Repenning 
considers how a product development process might be crippled by 
fire fighting.235 Specifically, the number of tasks required to complete 
a project might increase slightly. This will marginally decrease the 
portion of concept development tasks that are finished in a given 
period. There will in turn be more design-phase problems and 
diminished final product quality. If this “shock” to the design system 
is limited, and the workload returns to normal, it might be 
contained. Or it could spread, with the system engaged in little 
concept development with final product quality substantially 
degraded.236  
Managers will respond to the initial descent into fire fighting by 
shifting resources. For example, a product manager might devote 
greater resources to a product with late-development problems. This 
allocation will lead to a local optimum, where the project is 
improved while the broader product development system is 
degraded. Managers are prone to give too much weight to the short-
term benefits of their decisions, while the systems effects of those 
decisions are delayed. Moreover, managers make attribution errors, 
such as when they blame the attitudes of people within the process as 
opposed to its broader structure. Therefore, they will make further 
decisions that will increase the vicious cycle by adding surveillance, 
reporting requirements, and other procedures to the work of 
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 235. See id. at 287–95. 
 236. Id. at 291. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:07 PM 
2063 The Paradox of Organizing 
 2103 
product engineers.237 To address problems of quantity in the 
response to environmental crises will require more dynamic resource 
planning techniques and a better understanding of how to combine 
double-loop learning (called for in the response to a novel event) 
with greater adherence to existing routines (that can prevent a 
system from descending into a cycle of declining performance).238  
B. Organizational Cognition 
1. Schemas 
The twin tasks of differentiation and integration that dominate 
organizing provide the setting in which the above system effects 
occur. The scope of these effects, such as interorganizational 
anarchy, practical drift, and fire fighting, is increased when they 
happen among, as opposed to within, organizations, such as in the 
midst of a response to an oil spill. They should give us pause before 
casually accepting calls for expanding plans and procedures featuring 
dozens of agencies and support teams. In addition to risks 
introduced by the structure of a response, we also have to consider 
how groups and individuals make sense of information and actions 
taken within the response system. Contingency planning hints at the 
cognitive management challenges inherent in organizing that should 
lead us to reconsider the mechanics of dramatically increased data-
gathering efforts following disasters. While system effects speak to 
the unintended consequences of organizational solutions to previous 
disasters, cognition concerns how organizations process information 
and make sense of those solutions. 
The unified response team was inundated with data that it had to 
process and understand. This raises three related concerns, each 
involving the paradox of organizing, discussed in the following three 
sections. The first is an information-processing problem. Organizing 
encourages the use of schemas, which are fixed categories and 
simplifying representations that impose order on the steady stream of 
information entering a system.239 For example, prior to 9/11, the 
intelligence community was concerned with a number of terrorist 
scenarios, including hijackings of single as opposed to multiple 
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aircraft, hijackings to gain the release of individuals held by the U.S. 
government, or the destruction of aircraft that were set with 
explosives overseas.240 There was little or no effort to develop 
terrorist scenarios involving hijackings of multiple aircraft that were 
domestic in origin, with no motive to communicate, and where the 
planes themselves would be used as explosives.241  
After the Gulf oil spill, Admiral Thad Allen similarly recalled that 
procedures in place that seemed effective for twenty years “became 
dysfunctional” given the magnitude of the spill.242 Post-disaster 
investigations reveal that important categories of action, such as 
addressing methane hydrate formation after, rather than before, 
equipment installation, establishing federal oversight over rig fires 
without the presence of a fire marshal, keeping oil out of marshlands 
instead of instituting Coast Guard procedures for its removal, using 
subsea in addition to surface dispersants, and responding to 
continuous leaks as opposed to discrete spills either inadequately 
informed contingency planning or were ignored.243  
A reasonable reaction to such findings would be to develop new 
categories to determine what are considered “in-family” as opposed 
to “out-of-family” events.244 In-family events are those that were at 
some point experienced and analyzed. Unique standard operating 
procedures might be built up around in-family events for future use, 
but the broader problem is schema-based processing itself, which 
teases in-family problems from the stream of data that organizations 
face. Schema-based processing, with its fixed categories and routines 
that store prior learning, is not ideal for responding to low-
probability, high-consequence events.245 Specifically, during a crisis 
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operation, there is a need for cognition that is not limited by 
automatic thinking (encouraged by standardization) or memory and 
sequential linkages of existing categories (encouraged by rule-based 
planning).246 Automatic and rule-based cognition limit an 
organization’s ability to address novelty.247 They erase necessary 
detail and inhibit efforts to unify bits of seemingly disparate 
information. Disasters require “controlled” cognition that will limit 
the chance that novel events or threats during a response will be 
perceived as “in-family” and handled with existing schemas or 
linkages of procedures.248 
While post-disaster accounts focus on the need for stronger 
coordination, added hierarchies within or across organizations can 
discourage controlled cognition. This is because hierarchies increase 
the demand for sequential or rule-based interaction among an 
organization’s subunits.249 The goal should be to locate where in a 
response system activity can be coordinated by mutual constraint and 
adjustment, as opposed to by plan or standardization across groups 
that hold mutually exclusive knowledge of a situation. To respond to 
a crisis using controlled cognition, the system should add 
redundancies of representation to the redundant technologies that 
are more often put into place.250 It should encourage overlapping 
knowledge across groups that are governed by loose coupling. Weak 
coordination will increase the extent to which groups return to 
earlier activities, preserving detail and encouraging a more nuanced 
understanding of novel contexts.251 Subunits should be made better 
aware of how their outputs can become inputs for other groups. 
Strengthening awareness of how each group must adjust its actions 
to fit the actions of others should be given priority.252 This will 
increase the number of elements of a response system that can detect 
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discrepancies from prior events, preserving vital information about 
novel threats as they emerge. Ultimately, each of these steps will 
reduce schema-based decision-making. 
2. Self-limiting data 
A second reaction to the stream of data and experience that 
characterizes crisis management is to call for greater amounts or 
different kinds of information. While organizing influences how that 
information is processed, it also affects how it is shared. 
Differentiation begins with the premise that cognitive load should be 
reduced by distributing information across groups. But structural 
differentiation also leads to information becoming lost or misplaced.  
During the oil spill, streams of data were directed up and down a 
rudimentary chain of command, and later, a more formal hierarchy. 
Data were distributed among agency heads and members of the 
National Response Team, between and within national laboratory, 
science advisory, and technical teams, and with the responsible party 
and the public, among other channels.253 For example, a team of 
scientists from three national laboratories provided diagnostic 
information to a Science Advisory Team created by Secretary Chu. 
The advisory team responded with its own data analysis tasks for the 
tri-labs team. BP was eventually asked to create worst-case scenarios 
for the outcomes of future decisions. The advisory team reviewed 
source control plans, and industry representatives provided 
additional information.254 Much of this work proceeded via 
conference call.255 These data sharing efforts were grafted onto and 
in addition to existing Unified Command structures.256 The number 
of constraints inhibiting adequate data sharing on dispersant 
availability and toxicity, skimmer location and manufacturing, 
closure of certain waters, sampling and water and air quality 
monitoring, well containment and collection innovations, shoreline 
conditions, and other issues was substantial.  
The composition of response teams and ad hoc groups, such as 
the tri-labs team and Flow Rate Technical Group, can reduce the 
quality of information exchanged. Diverse groups are organized to 
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mimic the complexity of an organization’s environment (an approach 
known as “requisite variety”).257 But if information is ambiguous, 
multiple viewpoints will increase the number of equally plausible 
meanings available.258 This will increase the likelihood that weak but 
important signals in the data will lie dormant. If they are in fact 
addressed, equally plausible meanings tend to be resolved through 
group decision-making processes that limit analysis and heighten 
advocacy.259 Diverse groups of specialists also fall victim to common 
knowledge and audience tuning effects.260 In particular, discussion of 
unique information is limited, as specialists working in teams focus 
on perceptions held in common. These dynamics also make it 
difficult to detect important anomalies.  
In addition, as the number of parties addressing a problem 
increases, the likelihood that each will obtain precisely the same 
information decreases.261 Specifically, increasing the number of 
parties increases the number of interpretations of information, 
making it more difficult to reach consensus. Groups also spend an 
inordinate amount of time decomposing information based on 
functional divisions (a “partition focus”).262 Those divisions may be 
no longer relevant, or might further lead to loss of information. The 
spill response was criticized for missing data gathering opportunities 
because of its focus on coordination tasks.263 These group dynamics 
suggest the need for closer attention to the self-limiting qualities of 
information, as well as how available information is negotiated. 
Particularly where a decision-making process is not yet worked out, 
as in the early weeks of the oil spill, novel information must pass tests 
of social as well as technical sufficiency across functional specialists, 
such as the theoretical scientists and engineers on the advisory team 
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and at BP.264 This process arguably slowed containment efforts. Such 
“negotiated information orders” arose around attempts to prove the 
validity of oil collection methods to the tri-labs team, develop 
monitoring protocols for well control operations, and agree to such 
tactically vital pieces of information as flow rate from the riser leak.265  
3. Enactment 
 The workings of ad hoc groups during the spill response suggest 
a third concern for organizational cognition: any response to a crisis 
will occur largely through enactment rather than planning.266 
Enactment happens when a stream of data and events becomes 
unintelligible, such as when a context is unfamiliar, a situation exists 
for which an organization has no operating procedures,267 or an 
event has too many equivocal meanings.268 In those moments, order 
must be imposed on the world. The spill response was punctuated 
with moments for which there was no map suggesting how to 
proceed: flow rates were revised, dispersants were used in novel ways 
revealing new operational concerns, and well-closure tests failed or 
yielded ambiguous results. In those kinds of moments, organizations 
engage in sensemaking, an ongoing, retrospective development of 
plausible rationales for actions already taken.269 Through 
sensemaking, organizations impose order on the world in the form 
of workable but temporary perceptual frameworks.  
An imposed or “enacted” order occurs through action and 
interpretation, not evaluation and choice. Crisis situations are 
constructed as much as they are already in existence. Actors such as 
the On-Scene Coordinator or members of a technical group 
construct a crisis as they search for reasons that will allow them to 
resume interrupted activities. Dispersant uses are retroactively 
authorized when new justifications emerge, such as their reduction 
of surface-level volatile organic compounds.270 Other uses must be 
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approved under conditions for which there are little or no data: a 
failed top-kill procedure leads to a thought of collecting 
hydrocarbons instead,271 increased flow rate estimates present a new 
reality,272 and the Well Integrity Team, including scientists from the 
national labs and the U.S. Geological Survey, arrives at a monitoring 
protocol to detect leaks into rock formations after a capping 
operation.273  
The presidential commission describes how order was imposed 
on the situation through testing and modeling efforts after a capping 
stack was fitted to the wellbore. Pressure test data revealed either an 
underground blowout, a different flow rate, or a new geological 
reality. 
Although the Well Integrity Team had calculated that it would take 
a total leak of approximately 100,000 barrels for hydrocarbons to 
reach the sea floor, the government determined that it would 
permit a leak of only 20,000 barrels before requiring the capping 
stack to be reopened. Using this figure and an estimate for the 
expected pressure at shut-in derived from BP’s modeling of the 
reservoir, the Well Integrity Team created guidelines for the test. If 
the pressure at shut-in was less than 6,000 psi, major well damage 
was likely: BP would have to terminate the test within six hours and 
reopen the well. If the shut-in pressure was greater than 7,500 psi, 
the risk of a leak was low, and the test could proceed for the full 48 
hours. Finally, if the shut-in pressure was between 6,000 and 7,500 
psi, the risk of a leak was uncertain—either there was a medium-
sized leak into the formation or the reservoir was highly depleted. 
Under this scenario, the test could proceed for 24 hours. . . . 
. . . Initial wellhead pressure readings were just over 6,600 psi, 
squarely in the uncertain middle range, and rising slowly. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The stakes were high. Keeping the stack shut could cause an 
underground blowout and, in the worst case, loss of a significant 
portion of the 110 million barrel reservoir into the Gulf. . . .  
. . . One participant recalled general agreement that, while the data 
supported reopening the capping stack, under the guidelines 
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established prior to shut-in, the stack could stay closed during the 
night. 
. . . . 
Overnight, [Well Integrity Team member] Hsieh attempted to 
develop a model that explained the results of the well integrity test. 
The biggest question was why the pressure had climbed above 
6,600 psi but not to the minimum expected shut-in pressure of 
7,500 psi. The answer was that the expectation had been based on 
an incomplete understanding of the reservoir’s geometry and on 
pressure readings from a gauge at the bottom of the BOP, which 
was inaccurate and functioning only sporadically. Using accurate 
pressure readings from the capping stack, along with a flow-rate 
estimate of 55,000 bbls/day and BP’s estimate that the reservoir 
originally contained 110 million barrels of oil, Hsieh was able to 
generate a model of the depleted reservoir that predicted the 
observed shut-in pressures without having to assume a significant 
leak into the formation. 
. . . .  
. . . As more time passed, Hsieh was able to improve his model 
using seismic data. The model continued to predict the behavior of 
the well, and a leak into the formation became a less and less likely 
scenario.274 
Enactment demonstrates that cognition can be created through 
action. Specifically, cognition lies in the patterns of interaction that 
occur in specific contexts.275 Those connections among behaviors, as 
opposed to individuals, are a critical unit of analysis for crisis 
response. We need to better understand the combinations of 
schemas and social contexts (i.e., patterns of interaction) that 
encourage the rich awareness of detail, reluctance to simplify, and 
sensitivity to operations that will avoid catastrophic outcomes as 
workable frameworks are created and imposed on new, ambiguous 
information. And we need to study patterns of work to locate 
reasons that are used to argue for a resumption of interrupted 
activities (such as industry conventions, prior expectations, and 
premises about how organizations work) and determine their role in 
facilitating or disrupting disaster response.276  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The paradox of organizing offers a useful frame for articulating 
the challenges of responding to an environmental crisis. The struggle 
to differentiate tasks and subunits and then piece them together 
during moments of great uncertainty, and the ways in which it can 
challenge and strain contingency planning, should receive greater 
attention. This Article takes a preliminary step by addressing how the 
organizational causes of crisis, rooted in the paradox of organizing 
and related information management challenges, are recreated and 
intensified during an interorganizational response. The dynamics at 
work included risk amplification and system degradation due to the 
structure of the response, including anarchy, drift, and fire fighting. 
They also involved the tasks of making sense of information within 
the response effort, which erases detail, limits whether data can be 
used to detect anomalies, and encourages responders to develop 
their own plausible rationales for equivocal data so that they can 
resume their tasks. Learning how the emergency response system, 
including the National Contingency Plan, might overcome these 
challenges deserves a place alongside the reporting requirements, 
safety compliance systems, data collection measures, redundant 
technologies, and other solutions that populate our assessments of 
environmental crises. 
Future commissions, those who develop emergency management 
systems, and legal scholars should consider how this paradox could 
be better managed. Research on incident command systems suggests 
that under certain circumstances, it is possible to blend traditional 
elements of bureaucracy (e.g., specialized roles, formal authority) 
with temporary organizations in a manner that achieves high 
reliability.277 Much is required, however, for such a system to prove 
effective. First, the system must be able to rapidly alter its formal 
structure. The process of altering a command system includes 
structure elaborating (filling various roles and positions while making 
sure that major activities are not assigned to specialized roles), role 
switching (transferring personnel according to role as a crisis 
evolves), authority migrating (distributing critical expertise 
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throughout the system, allowing decision-making authority to 
migrate quickly among existing positions and giving deference to 
lower level, more technically qualified members of the team), and 
system resetting (enabling a complete reconfiguration of the system 
in response to unexpected events).278 Second, the system must allow 
for an appropriate amount of constrained improvisation, bounded by 
existing rules and routines.279 Finally, managers must encourage 
overlapping, accurate understandings of the systems of activity to 
which response team members belong (also called “operational 
representation”).280 Maintaining the integrity of operational 
representation throughout a command system as it is developed, 
communicated, and shifted is crucial to the system’s ability to 
respond to novelty while muting the effects of practical drift. The 
extent to which an incident command system can use structuring and 
cognitive management approaches to counteract the dynamics 
addressed in this Article should be the focus of future investigations 
and reform efforts. 
The challenges posed by the paradox of organizing can also 
inform the growing concern over agency fragmentation, in 
environmental law and elsewhere in the administrative state.281 The 
paradox of organizing is helpful in several ways. It suggests how we 
might define the concept of coordination, which Jody Freeman and 
Jim Rossi identify as the root cause of governance failures stemming 
from inter-agency delegation and overlap: “Such delegations may 
produce redundancy, inefficiency, and gaps, but more than anything 
else, they create profound coordination challenges.”282 Freeman and 
Rossi make an important contribution, setting out the origins and 
types of multiagency delegations, explaining why consolidation will 
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only be available under limited circumstances, and comparing the 
costs and benefits of coordination tools such as consultation, inter-
agency agreement, joint policy-making, and centralized review.283  
But coordination is inherently difficult to define. In the disaster 
management literature, confusion over the concept leads to 
disagreement over how a successful response operation should be 
defined.284 As was pointed out in the late 1970s, such confusion 
exists because there are in fact too many definitions of 
interorganizational coordination.285 Each embraces a different school 
of theory, be it game theory, resource exchange, contingency theory, 
or transaction cost economics, among others.286 Clarification of the 
concept of coordination is also needed to specify its costs and 
benefits, whether it happens in the midst of a crisis or during more 
routine actions, and to guide discussion of how coordination can be 
improved after an exogenous shock to an interorganizational system.  
Viewing environmental crisis response as a coordination problem 
suggests that the simplest definition may be the most helpful. 
Thompson’s research on organizing provided the foundation for 
some of the key dynamics that were set in motion during the BP oil 
spill response, such as Weick’s work on the influence of hierarchy on 
cognition or Snook’s concept of practical drift. At its core is the 
notion of coordination as the management of dependencies among 
actions.287 Thompson recognized that the process of differentiation, 
which sets the paradox of organizing in motion, leads to different 
levels of interdependence among organizations or subunits.288 Each 
form of interdependence (his focus was limited to three kinds: 
                                                
 283. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 282. 
 284. Thomas E. Drabek & David A. McEntire, Emergent Phenomena and 
Multiorganizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature, 20 INT’L 
J. MASS EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS 197, 204–05 (2002) (suggesting such definitions as (a) 
taking account of the activities of others, (b) deliberate adjustment, (c) relaying information so 
that individual efforts are linked with those of others, (d) agreeing on function priority and 
performance efforts, (e) integrating tasks reinforced by norms, and (f) eliminating gaps in 
service and unnecessary duplications of service). 
 285. AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
POLICY ANALYSIS (1979). 
 286. See, e.g., ERNEST R. ALEXANDER, HOW ORGANIZATIONS ACT TOGETHER: 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7–14 (1995); Thomas 
W. Malone & Kevin Crowston, The Interdisciplinary Study of Coordination, in 
COORDINATION THEORY AND COLLABORATION TECHNOLOGY 40–43 (Gary M. Olson, 
Thomas W. Malone & John B. Smith eds., 2001); Ahdieh, supra note 282, at 603–07. 
 287. Malone & Crowston, supra note 286, at 10. 
 288. THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 54–56. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
2114 
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal) calls for different coordination 
mechanisms, the use or ill use of which can lead to failures to detect 
anomaly, mistakes that gain momentum as they migrate across 
organizations, inappropriate mixtures of adjustment to novelty and 
adherence to existing routines, and other problems that were 
discussed in this Article.  
Thompson’s innovation was to recognize that the form of 
interdependence significantly affects the form of coordination 
applied within or across organizations. The concept of 
interdependence has been used to define the costs of coordination 
since at least the work of early systems theorists and organization 
design scholars often use the terms interchangeably.289 Further 
research on the challenges of regulatory overlap and fragmentation 
should expand upon this work. It should set out the common 
dependencies, both actual and interpretive, that arise in different 
regulatory contexts,290 using Thompson’s typology of pooled, 
sequential, and reciprocal interdependence and related coordination 
mechanisms as a point of departure. Research on environmental and 
other crises should determine the processes available to manage these 
and other forms of interdependence291 and whether their use during 
a crisis will lead to risk accumulation, system degradation, or 
resilience. The next commission should take note of what this 
research has yet to discover. 
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